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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS, HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH
CARE UTILIZATION
BY
PELIN O¨ZLU¨K
AUGUST 2018
Committee Chair: Charles Courtemanche
Major Department: Economics
National Health Expenditures Accounts estimates that U.S health care spending grew
4.3 percent from the previous year to reach $3.3 trillion, or $10,338 per person in 2016.
The overall share of gross domestic product (GDP) related to health care spending was 17.9
percent in 2016, up from 17.7 percent in 2015. Moreover, increased use of opioid prescriptions
led to excessive use and abuse of these drugs, resulting in nationwide “opioid epidemic”. This
dissertation examines how different policy interventions contributed to the rise in health care
utilization and prescribed opioids in U.S.
The first chapter examines how medical marijuana laws changed utilization of prescription
drugs with a special emphasis on prescribed opioids. More than half of the US population
lives in a state that has adopted medical marijuana laws (MMLs). Studies show that most
medical marijuana patients use marijuana for managing their pain with the overwhelming
majority of them preferring it to opioids. Despite ongoing pro-marijuana policies and the
growing trend of public acceptance, the evidence on how people change their prescription
use due to the availability of marijuana as an alternative treatment is limited. Using the
variations across state MMLs between 1996 and 2014 of Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) this paper estimates the effects of MMLs on prescription drug utilization, with a
focus on opioids. I find that MMLs lead to a $2.47 decrease in per person prescribed opioid
spending among young adults (ages 18-39) over a year. Most of this decrease results from
the intensive margin of use and MML states that allow home cultivation experience even
larger decreases. Furthermore, the decreasing effects are persistent over time and they get
stronger following the years of implementation. MMLs also decrease the number of opioid
pill use among young adults. I do not find any discernible impact on older populations'
opioid utilization. I then investigate the effects on other prescriptions for which marijuana
can be a potential substitute and find the allowance of dispensaries is generally associated
with decreases, although the effects depend on the type of MML, the margin of use and age.
The second chapter examines how universal insurance coverage affects health care utiliza-
tion drawing evidence from the health reform of Massachusetts in 2006. This law reformed
insurance markets, mandated that all residents in the state would be required to take up
health insurance, and provided subsidies for lower-income individuals to purchase it. Using
data from MEPS between 2000 and 2015, I provide evidence that the Massachusetts health
care reform increased counts of hospital and office-based medical provider visits significantly.
The results were robust to using alternative control groups and different functional form as-
sumptions. I find the reform's effects grew over time, reaching its maximum after 2010. The
reform also increased health care expenditures and probability of health care service use
significantly. Finally, I use the reform to instrument for health insurance and estimate large
impacts of insurance on health care utilization.
The third chapter examines the impact of the Affordable Care Act on health care uti-
lization. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) aimed to achieve nearly universal health insurance
coverage in the United States through a combination of regulations, mandates, subsidies,
exchanges, and Medicaid expansions. We use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) to investigate the impacts of the ACA on the health care utilization and ex-
penditures of non-elderly adults. A difference-in-difference-in-differences strategy separately
identifies the effects of the ACA's expansions of private and Medicaid coverage by leveraging
variation in states' Medicaid expansion decisions and individuals' pre-ACA insurance status.
Intuitively, impacts of the ACA's insurance expansions should be concentrated among those
who lacked insurance prior to the law, and such individuals are more likely to be affected
in states that participated in the Medicaid expansion. Similar methods have been used to
study the ACA's effects on outcomes such as health insurance coverage, access to care, risky
health behaviors, and self-assessed health. However, they have not been previously used to
investigate impacts on health care spending. Theoretically, the net effect on spending is
ambiguous. On one hand, insurance lowers the effective price of care, which should increase
utilization across-the-board. On the other hand, insurance improves access to primary and
preventive care, which could potentially reduce use of expensive emergency services. The
results suggest that the ACA increased health care utilization in some dimensions – in-
cluding counts of inpatient hospital visits, medical-provider office visits and total counts of
prescription fills, inpatient, outpatient, medical-provider office and ER visits combined on
its first year. However, these increases in health care utilization in counts were not observed
in ACA's second year. We also found that the ACA increased coverage and led to significant
gains in both expansion and non-expansion states consistent with what has been found by
prior studies. This significant gain in insurance was not limited to ACA's first year but it
carried to second year.
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Medical Marijuana
Laws on Utilization of Prescribed
Opioids and Other Prescription Drugs
1.1 Introduction
Between 1996 and 2017, 29 states and the District of Columbia enacted laws that
legalized the medical use of marijuana. Eight states and D.C. legalized recreational use and
19 states and D.C. have operating dispensaries. The total estimated value of legal marijuana
sales in the United States was $5.7 billion in 2015 and $7.1 billion in 2016 (Arcview, 2017).
The market is projected to grow as more than half of the U.S population now lives in
a state where marijuana is legalized either medically or recreationally. Understanding the
consequences of legalizing marijuana as a medicine is important as more states are discussing
new medical marijuana laws (MMLs) in the near future. However, all these ongoing pro-
marijuana policies are founded on limited scientific evidence on marijuana's effects on health
due to the federal government's classification of marijuana as a Schedule 1 substance, which
imposes significant barriers to conducting randomized controlled trials with human subjects
to study marijuana's effects.
1
Despite the limitations, there is some evidence suggesting that marijuana can im-
prove several health conditions and symptoms like nausea and vomiting, loss of appetite,
depression, anxiety, chronic pain, and muscle spasms, as well as regulate sleep.1 Prior stud-
ies generally find that the most reported reason for using medical marijuana among medical
marijuana patients is the relief of pain, and most of those who use it for pain relief use it to-
gether with their opioid-based prescriptions.2 According to a recent survey from a database
of medical marijuana patients conducted by Reiman et al. (2017), 63% of participants re-
ported using marijuana for pain-related conditions. 30% reported using an opioid-based drug
and of those 61% reported using it with marijuana. In addition, more than 97% of their
sample agreed they were able to decrease the amount of opioids they consume when they
also used marijuana. 53% of their participants were between 20 and 39 years old.
Allowing marijuana as an option to treat pain and other symptoms can have two
opposing effects on people's prescription opioid and other drug utilization. First, it can
reduce utilization by inducing people to substitute away from prescriptions to marijuana.
Second, MMLs can act like direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising, inducing people
to seek medical help for their conditions, which in turn increases demand for prescriptions.
This paper examines if MMLs influence prescription drug utilization with a partic-
ular focus on opioids; a category of powerful pain-reducing medicines with severe risks of
addiction, abuse, overdose and death.3 Using Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
household and prescribed medicine files, I estimate the effects of MML implementation and
1Whiting et al. (2015); Borgelt et al. (2013); Jensen et al. (2015); Institute of Medicine (1999), Amar
(2006), National Academies, (2017).
2Reinerman et al. (2011), Reiman et al. (2017).
3According to Centers for Disease Control (CDC), half of all U.S. opioid deaths involve a prescription
opioid and 91 Americans die from opioid overdose every day. Deaths from prescription opioids and the sales
of these prescriptions drugs have quadrupled from 1999. National Institute on Drug Abuse reports young
adults (age 18 to 25) are the biggest abusers of prescription opioid pain relievers and in 2014 more than
1,700 died from prescription drug (mainly opioid) overdoses-more than died from overdoses of any other
drug, including heroin and cocaine combined. https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/
infographics/abuse-prescription-rx-drugs-affects-young-adults-most.
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its provisions on utilization of prescribed opioids by exploiting the variations in MMLs across
states over time. For my main analysis, I show results from two-part models, jointly estimat-
ing the extensive and intensive margins of prescribed opioid expenditures and their effects
on each part of the model separately. I then examine MMLs' effects on utilization of other
categories of drugs for which medical marijuana is a plausible substitute. Studying the ef-
fects on these other prescriptions is also important because they make up a large portion of
overall health care expenditures.
My main results indicate that MMLs significantly decrease expenditures on opioids
among young adults (ages 18-39) by $2.47 per person over a year. This decreasing effect
results from the significant decrease on the intensive margin, implying that rather than quit-
ting opioids altogether, young adults continue to use them with marijuana. States allowing
home cultivation of marijuana experience even larger decreases in opioid expenditures. Fur-
thermore, these decreasing effects of MMLs on opioid expenditures are persistent over time
and they get stronger following the years of MML implementation. The results are similar
when we consider the effects on the total amount of prescribed opioid pills. Namely, imple-
mentation of a MML decreases the total amount of prescription opioid pills by 2.16 pills per
person over a year among young adults. I find no discernible effect of MMLs on the opioid
utilization of older populations.
I then estimate MML's effects on utilization of other prescription drugs and find that
MML states which allow retail dispensaries generally experience decreases on spending for
the drugs which marijuana can substitute among young adults. MML is also associated with
significant decreases in sedatives among elderly population (ages 65+). The results from
other prescription drugs mostly depend on age and the level of access MMLs provide to
marijuana.
Based on my findings MMLs can potentially alleviate the problems associated with
opioid misuse in younger adults, the biggest abusers of prescription opioids. MMLs with
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looser restrictions, especially those that allow greater access by legalizing dispensaries and
allowing home cultivation, can reduce excess medical costs associated with adverse drug
events4, which cause more than 1 million emergency department visits and cost $3.5 billion
each year (Aspden et al. 2007). The third reason why MMLs can be useful is because it can
reduce the costs on the insurance pool. Medical marijuana is not covered by insurance like
prescription drugs. If people switch to marijuana they pay it out of pocket. If MMLs turn a
public health care cost into a private cost this can be welfare increasing by internalizing an
externality.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature and
provides background information on prevalence of marijuana on health and the evidence on
its substitutability with opioids. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework by laying out a
simple patient-physician interaction in an MML state and gives some testable implications.
Section 4 describes the data, variable measurement, and identification strategy. Section 5
shows primary results of the effects of MML on opioids and Section 6 presents sensitivity
analyses and examines effects on other prescriptions. I conclude with a summary of my
findings and implications for future medical marijuana policy design in Section 7.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Medical uses of marijuana and substitutability with opioids
The National Sciences report of 2017 systemically reviewed the most recently pub-
lished studies since 2011 that were “fair-and-good quality” in reaching conclusions on the
4An adverse drug event (ADE) is an injury resulting from medical intervention related to a drug. This
includes medication errors, adverse drug reactions, allergic reactions, and overdoses. (Office of Disease
Prevention and Health Promotion). https://health.gov/hcq/ade.asp
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health effects of cannabis.5 The report finds: 1) conclusive evidence that cannabis is effective
in reducing chronic pain in adults, cancer-induced nausea and vomiting and patient-reported
spasticity symptoms, 2) moderate evidence that cannabis is effective in improving short-term
sleep outcomes, and 3) limited evidence that cannabis is effective in improving symptoms of
anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Whiting et al. (2015) did a meta-analysis from a total of 79 trials (6462 participants)
and reported the following findings: 1) moderate-quality evidence to suggest cannabis was
beneficial for the treatment of chronic neuropathic or cancer pain and spasticity due to mul-
tiple sclerosis, 2) low-quality evidence to suggest cannabis was associated with improvements
in cancer-induced nausea and vomiting, weight gain in HIV and sleep disorders, and 3) very
low-quality evidence to suggest cannabis was associated with improvement in anxiety.
Given the risks and problems associated with opioid use and the growing acceptance
of using marijuana as a medicine it is natural to ask two questions: 1) Can marijuana be
a substitute for opioid-based medicines, and if so 2) do people really substitute away from
opioids to marijuana? The literature from clinical studies and with selected samples from
medical marijuana patients suggests that medical marijuana patient may substitute opioids
for marijuana.
Abrams et al. (2011) study the cannabis-opioid interaction drawing evidence from 21
patients with chronic pain. They conclude that cannabis augments the pain relieving effects
of opioids and their combination may allow for opioid treatment at lower doses with fewer
side effects. Drawing evidence from an open-label clinical research trial, Haroutounian et al.
(2016) found treatment of chronic pain with medicinal cannabis resulted in improved pain
outcomes and a significant reduction in opioid use.
5Scientific literature refers to marijuana as cannabis. I use the terms “marijuana” and “cannabis” inter-
changeably in this paper.
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In addition to the clinical results above, there is suggestive evidence that medical
marijuana patients change their opioid use in response to medical marijuana use. Studies
involving surveys of medical marijuana patients report that the most common reason patients
cited for using medical marijuana was the relief of pain (Reinerman et al. 2011; Reiman et
al. 2017). Reinerman et al. (2011) find 79.3% of the medical marijuana patients reported
having tried other medicines presented by their physicians and almost half of them were
opioids. Reiman et al. (2017) find 30% of their sample reported using an opioid-based
medication currently or in the past six months and out of those 61% reported using it with
cannabis. More strikingly, they report that 92% of the sample “strongly agreed/agreed”
that they prefer cannabis to opioids and 93% “strongly agreed/agreed” that they would be
more likely to choose cannabis for opioids to treat their condition. Boehnke et al. (2017)
find medical cannabis use was associated with a 64% decrease in opioid use among medical
marijuana patients with chronic pain between 2013 and 2015 in Michigan.
Although there is some evidence that availability of marijuana decreases the use of
opioids, it is hard to extrapolate these results from the above studies to wider populations
since their conclusions are based on small and selected samples that rely on self-reported
outcomes.
1.2.2 Effects of MMLs and contribution of this study
Although the literature on MMLs is rich, the effects studied are mostly focused on
their unintended consequences, such as recreational marijuana use, alcohol consumption,
initiation by youth, drunk driving, cigarettes and other substance use. Lynne-Landsman et
al. (2013) show no effects of MMLs on adolescent marijuana use in the first few years after
their enactment using the National Youth Risk Behavioral Surveys (YRBS). Anderson et
al. (2015) revisit the relationship using data from the national and state YRBS, Treatment
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Episode dataset, and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997. They find MMLs were not
associated with an increase in marijuana use among teenagers. Anderson et al. (2013) found
a significant and negative relationship between MML and traffic fatalities, especially for
those involving alcohol. Pacula et al. (2015) re-examine the effects of MMLs on recreational
marijuana use by adult and youth populations and they also examine different provisions
of MMLs. They report that treating MMLs as one dichotomous variable hide the effects of
different provisions of MMLs. They show that not all MMLs are the same and the provisions
of the law matter. In particular, they find that the MMLs that legally protect dispensaries
can increase recreational marijuana use and abuse among adults and youth compared to
MMLs that do not protect this supply source. Wen et al. (2015) show estimates from
the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) and report that MMLs increase
marijuana use and abuse among people who are 21 and older and initiation in younger
populations. They also find MMLs increase binge drinking for 21 and above but have no
effect on psychoactive substance use in either age group.
The MML literature on problematic opioid use is less comprehensive. Bauchhuber
et al. (2014) examined state-level death certificates in the U.S. between 1999 and 2010
and found that states with MMLs had lower mean annual opioid overdose mortality rates
compared with states without them. Powell et al. (2015) studied the effects of MML on
problematic opioid use and found that broader access to marijuana reduced the abuse of
highly addictive painkillers. Smart (2015) finds that growth in the supply of medical mar-
ijuana decreases opioid poisonings for adults between 45 and 64 by 12-16%. Yuan (2017)
finds MMLs were associated with 23% and 13% reductions in hospitalization related to opi-
oid abuse and overdose respectively. These studies all involve outcomes of people on the
margins of abusive and possibly non-medical use. In this paper, I will show the effects on
outcomes involving prescribed opioid use from a sample which represents the U.S population
more broadly, and not from a population of opioid abusers.
7
The literature examining the effects on prescription drug use more broadly is very
limited. Bradford and Bradford (2016) examined data on all prescription drugs filled by
physicians for the Medicare Part D enrollees from 2010 to 2013. They find that MML
implementation led to significant reductions in daily doses filled per physician in seven drug
categories for which marijuana can serve as an alternative. These conditions include anxiety,
depression, nausea, pain, psychosis, seizures and sleep disorders. In another paper Bradford
and Bradford (2017) find significant negative associations between the presence of MML
and quarterly logged average prescription units filled for the aforementioned drug categories
among the Medicaid population from 2007 to 2014.
I extend the studies from the Bradford and Bradford articles in several ways. First,
my analyses span 1996 to 2014, giving me a richer source of policy variation. During those
19 years, 23 states and D.C implemented MMLs and this relatively longer time horizon also
enables me to estimate the long run effects of MMLs. Second, my observations are represen-
tative of the U.S population instead of consisting of patients on Medicaid and Medicare with
positive spending. I will show the effects of MMLs on the extensive and intensive margins
separately. It is plausible that MMLs affect prescription use differently on these two margins
since the decisions on the probability of use and amount of use are decided by different
agents. Third, this paper will investigate isolated effects of different MML provisions. Prior
research suggests heterogeneity in MMLs lead to different effects which indicates that the
design of these laws is essential in analyzing the costs and benefits of MMLs. Lastly, I focus
explicitly on the utilization of opioids, defining utilization in terms of expenditures and pills
both. Knowing how MMLs change the utilization of prescribed opioids and other prescrip-
tion drugs is not only important for the analysis of MMLs but also important within the
context of the growing trend of prescription drug costs and the costs associated with their
misuse, such as the recent epidemic of opioid abuse.
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1.3 Theoretical Framework
There are many mechanisms through which MMLs and their provisions can affect
the demand of prescription drugs for which marijuana can be a substitute. The first and
most obvious effect would be that patients with these conditions will seek their physicians'
recommendation to substitute their prescriptions with marijuana. However, having a MML
in place may also encourage a fraction of people who also had the conditions/symptoms but
for some reason did not visit a physician before a MML was enacted. Enactment of a MML
may serve to inform these people about their existing conditions and to seek medical help
just like how direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs would. Due to informa-
tion asymmetry, the physician is the agent of the patient and she will make the decision
whether to and if so, how much to prescribe/recommend an FDA-approved prescription or
medical marijuana. Given marijuana's classification as a Schedule 1 drug, and the resulting
absence of scientific evidence and incentives that the physician would have if she prescribed
prescriptions supplied by the pharmaceutical firm (low cost of information due to heavy
advertising/detailing/scientific evidence/habit formation, less risk), some physicians will be
reluctant to substitute it.
Following Brekke et al. (2006), I assume there is a continuum of patients with a
condition in a therapeutic drug market which marijuana can have a potential to treat on
the line segment [0, 1]. The location of the patient x ∈ [0,1] is associated with his condition
and personal characteristics. They all need either a prescription drug (Rx=0) or medical
marijuana (m=1). Rx and m are located at the either ends of a unit interval [0, 1] and
are indexed as i. This classification of 0 and 1 only reflect their chemical compounds and
the treatment effects. I assume the patient's utility takes the following linear form when he
takes the treatment i :
Upatient(x, i) = υ − τ |x− i| − Ci (1.1)
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where the parameter υ represents the effectiveness of drug i. I assume that both treatments
Rx and m have the same effectiveness but they differ in their treatment effects to a given
x. τ represents the weight given to the utility loss that is realized due to the mismatch
between the condition x and the treatment choice (the distance between the condition and
the treatment choice). These can be thought of as side effects. I assume that v and τ are
both positive. Ci represents the out-of-pocket cost for the treatment.
Consider a population of people who have a condition and let z ∈ [0,1] be the fraction
of patients who already saw a doctor related with their condition and (1-z ) the fraction of
patients who have the condition but did not see a doctor yet (potential patients). When
states adopt MMLs this can serve as a marijuana advertisement inducing some of these
potential patients to be aware of their conditions and encourage them to go to the doctor's
office. Let φ ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of patients who receive information about the legalization
of medical marijuana in their state. I assume all patients need a treatment, whether medical
marijuana or a prescription drug. Only potential patients who have not heard about MMLs
will not go to a doctor's office. The fraction of patients who go to the doctor's office for
treatment is then N=z+(1-z )φ.
I assume all physicians face the same distribution of patients. Once the patient goes
to the physician, the physician asks questions to determine the patient's type; his location
x ∈ [0,1]. After observing the patient's type the physicians can either recommend medical
marijuana or prescribe a drug. I assume there are two type of physicians. The first physicians
who will not recommend medical marijuana no matter how much the patient insists; I call
them “Type 1 physician” and denote their share as θ. The second is physicians who are
willing to recommend marijuana if the patient insists. I call them “Type 2 physicians” and
their share is (1-θ).
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Consider a type 1 physician who will not recommend marijuana in any case. I assume
her utility function takes the linear form below;
Uphysician(x,Rx) = bRx + γU
patient (1.2)
where bRx denotes the private benefit she receives from prescribing the prescription drug and
γ denotes the weight she puts on her patient's utility. Plugging the patient's utility given in
equation (1) type 1 physician will prescribe Rx to the patient x only if the following is true:
Uphysician(x,Rx) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ bRx + γυ − γτx− γCRx ≥ 0 (1.3)
If Uphysician(.)<0, then the physician will recommend a different treatment or no
treatment at all. Consider a type 1 physician who is indifferent between prescribing and not
prescribing. Solving (3) we get
x˜ =
bRx + γυ − γCRx
γτ
(1.4)
She will prescribe the drug if the patient x is on the interval [0,x˜] and not prescribe if the
patient is between [x˜,1].
Now consider a type 2 physician who considers marijuana as an alternative to Rx.
She will recommend marijuana (m) instead of Rx only if the following condition holds:
Uphysician(x,m) ≥ Uphysician(x,Rx) ⇐⇒ bm + γ(υ − τ(1− x)− Cm)
≥ bRx + γ(υ − τx− CRx)
(1.5)
where bm denotes the private benefit (or cost – e.g., her time cost of searching for information
about marijuana or the cost of writing a recommendation letter) the physician gets from
11
recommending medical marijuana and Cm denotes the financial cost of medical marijuana to
the patient. Let x˜ denote the patient for whom the physician is indifferent in recommending
m vs. prescribing Rx. By solving (4) we get;
xˆ =
1
2
− (γ(CRx − Cm) + bm − bRx
2γτ
)
This means the physician will recommend marijuana if the patient x is located on [xˆ,1] and
prescribe Rx if he is on [0,xˆ]. Since the physician will not recommend m or prescribe Rx if
her utility is not positive the condition
bm + γ(υ − τ(1− xˆ)− Cm) = bRx + γ(υ − τ xˆ− CRx) ≥ 0
must hold. This is satisfied when x˜≥xˆ.
Proposition 1 Entrance of medical marijuana as another treatment option will decrease
the ‘mismatch’ between a given therapeutic condition and the prescription drug substituting
marijuana with prescription drugs.
Proposition 2 Substitution effect; x˜-xˆ≥0 will be higher for more expensive drugs and/or
for drugs which treat conditions that are not a good match with the prescription drug (or
drugs with more severe side effects).
Proposition 3 In states where the patient's cost of obtaining marijuana is lower (small
Cm) and physician's benefit of recommending it is higher (or lower cost of recommending,
high bm), more prescription drugs will be substituted.
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From the physician's choices above we can derive the shares of patients who get Rx
and m respectively,
MRx = [z + (1− z)φ] ∗ [θx˜+ (1− θ)xˆ] and,
Mm = [z + (1− z)φ] ∗ [(1− θ)(1− xˆ)].
If a MML was not enacted the share of the patients who would be on Rx would simply
be z x˜. The difference between the share of prescription drugs after and before the MML
then would be x˜[θφ(1-z )+z (θ-1)]+xˆ(1-θ)[z+(1-z )φ]. A high enough θφ (the fraction of new
patients who visit the type 1 physician) could increase the prescription drug shares after the
MML.
Proposition 4 If the share of new patients that visit the type 1 physician (θφ) is high enough
prescription drug utilization can increase after the MML.
Proposition 5 For prescription drugs which are already a good match with a given condition
(less severe side effects), utilization can increase after the MML.
1.4 Estimation
To determine the effects of MMLs on prescription drug spending I use prescribed
medicine event-level data linked to person level data from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) spanning 1996 to 2014. Starting from 1996, MEPS collects detailed in-
formation for each person in selected households. This information includes demographic
characteristics, health insurance coverage and income. MEPS Prescribed Medicine Files
contain pharmacy-provided information on names of prescribed medicines obtained, their
therapeutic class and sub-class, total amount paid for the prescribed medicines and source
of their payments for each time a prescription drug was purchased.
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The MEPS is a nationally representative panel survey and it has an overlapping panel
design. A new panel of sample households is selected each year and they are surveyed for
two years. I acquired the unrestricted version of MEPS with state identifiers and merged the
state-and year-level MML variables. As seen in Table 1.1, 23 states and D.C implemented
MMLs during the study period.
Since the literature suggests that there is relatively stronger evidence of marijuana
as a painkiller and the fact that the majority of medical marijuana patients use it for their
pain, specifically preferring it to opioid-based painkillers, I choose the main outcome variable
as the total amount of dollars spent on opioid-based medicines. Focusing on opioids is also
important from a policy perspective considering the costs associated with opioid misuse.
The key independent variables are indicators for MML implementation (effective
dates) in a given state and year and its individual components. As noted by Pacula et
al. (2015), MML states differ highly in how they allow medical marijuana and ignoring
the heterogeneities in these policy dimensions that exist both across time and states can
mask their heterogeneous effects and the mechanisms through which MMLs affect utiliza-
tion. Following Pacula et al. (2015) and Wen et al. (2015), I analyze the effects of four
key components that can lead to heterogeneity in prescription drug utilization: i) a “retail
dispensary” provision, an indicator of whether the state's MML explicitly allows/protects
dispensaries to dispense marijuana to medical marijuana patients, ii) a “home cultivation”
provision, an indicator of whether a state's MML allows the medical marijuana patient to
cultivate a certain amount of marijuana, iii) a “non-specific pain” provision, an indicator
of whether the state's MML lists any chronic pain or intractable pain in the eligible condi-
tions for medical marijuana instead of specifically listing the conditions associated with the
pain, and iv) a “patient registry” provision, an indicator for whether a state's MML requires
the patient registry. These provisions can directly determine both the monetary and search
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costs of obtaining medical marijuana of the patient as well as marijuana's perceived risk and
appropriateness for recommendation from the physician's view.
I control for individual and state level factors that are correlated with prescription
drug spending and with state decisions about MMLs. Individual-level covariates include a
rich set of sociodemographic and economic characteristics. State-level covariates include four
time-varying measures reflecting the variations in state economic conditions between 1996
and 2014: i) state unemployment rate, ii) state median household income, iii) state average
personal income, and iv) state uninsured rate. I include two policy variations during the
study period that can affect prescription drug spending and MML implementation. These
state-level policy variables include indicators for operational prescription drug monitoring
programs (PDMPs) and the implementation of a marijuana decriminalization/depenalization
in a state.
After pooling all the year, collapsing the prescribed opioid transactions at the year-
and person-level and excluding people under the age of 18, I have a sample of 435,035
person level observations. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show the summary statistics for dependent and
independent variables.
1.4.1 Data characteristics and two-part model
Like other health care utilization data, prescription drug utilization distributions tend
to be skewed because 1) there cannot be negative spending, 2) there is a mass at point zero
for non-users, 3) patients with more severe conditions use substantially more on prescription
drugs than those with less severe conditions, and 4) there can be a small number of patients
with astronomical spending due to catastrophic health conditions. Health economists often
use log-transformed models to deal with these types of skewed outcomes. Other approaches
include more flexible methods of conditional density estimation or estimation with GLM.
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Certain transformations such as logging are not appropriate, especially when there is a large
mass of zeros. First, adding an arbitrary constant to observations is not recommended, and
second, using one-part models implicitly assume that observations with zero outcomes are
similarly affected by covariates as nonzero outcomes. These models are shown to behave
poorly compared to multi-part models (Duan et al. 1983; Mihaylova et al. 2011).
Due to the presence of the zero mass of non-users in the data, I use a two-part model
approach. The two-part model splits the prescription spending into two parts and applies
the basic rule of probability in estimating the parameters in the conditional mean function
E(y|x)=Pr(y>0|x)×E(y|y>0,x).
Figure 1.1 shows the nonlinearities in the distribution of opioid spending. There is a
large mass of non-users (approximately 90%), and the spending from users is skewed to the
right even after logging.
Since health care utilization data show heteroscedasticity, a re-transformation that
assumes homoscedastic, normally distributed log-scale error terms will give biased results.
Due to the complications that can arise with estimating the correct form of heteroscedas-
ticity, I avoid using OLS on logged outcomes with heteroscedastic retransformation and use
GLM for consistent estimation instead. The advantages of using GLM compared to models
with transformations are more broadly discussed in Manning and Mullahy (2001) and Jones
(2000).
GLM extends the classical linear models in two ways. First, it allows the dependent
variable to be distributed with any exponential family. Second, it allows for any monotonic
differentiable function of the dependent variable to vary linearly with the covariates (the link
function), rather than requiring the dependent variable itself to respond linearly (McCullagh
and Nelder 1989). Another advantage of using GLM is that it gives predictions on the raw
scale since it does not transform data and it also allows for heteroscedasticity. Modeling
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health care utilization and costs with GLM is a common approach in the literature (e.g.
Goda et al. 2011; Chandra et al. 2014; Strumpf et al. 2017).
For the baseline model, I use probit estimation, shown below, to estimate the proba-
bility of being a prescription drug user:
Pr(Yiast > 0 | X) = Φ(Xβ)
where Yiast is the binary variable equal to one if the consumption for a person i living in
state s in year t for the drug category a is positive and zero otherwise. X is a vector of
explanatory variables including all the control variables in Table 3, state and year fixed
effects and state-specific linear time trends to capture the state-level factors that evolve over
time at a constant rate.
For the intensive margin, I use GLM models with log-link and gamma family to
estimate the amount of spending conditional on being a user as shown below:
E(Yiast | Yiast > 0, X) = exp(Xγ)
where Yiast denotes the prescription drug spending for person i for drug category a in state
s and year t, while X denotes the same vector of covariates as in the first part.
As suggested by Manning and Mullahy (2001), I used modified Park tests to determine
the relationship between the conditional variance and the conditional mean functions, namely
the parameter δ in Var [Yiast|Yiast>0,X]=α[E(Yiast | Yiast > 0, X)]δ. In all drug cases, δˆ was
closest to 2 implying the gamma family.
Standard errors in all regressions are robust to heteroscedasticity and they are clus-
tered at the state level to correct for serial correlation. The clustered standard errors allow
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the errors to be correlated within states while allowing them to be independent across states
(Bertrand et al. 2004).
As the main results, I report the combined marginal effects from both parts of the
model6
E(Yiast | X) = Pr(Yiast | X > 0)× E(Yiast | Yiast > 0, X)
This setup models the difference in utilization on the original scale of the dependent
variable (dollar amount) yielding estimates that are readily interpretable. It also allows
for heteroscedasticity where Var(Expenditure|X) depends on the mean level of conditional
expenditures, E(Expenditure|X).
I also report the results from probability of use and amount of use separately. It
is possible that MMLs (and their provisions) have opposite effects on each margin of use,
especially if they act as an advertisement and encourage people to visit doctors who then
prescribe them drugs, increasing the probability of utilization, while decreasing the amount
of utilization by the users that are already on these drugs. If MMLs have opposite signs in
different parts, then it would be possible for the marginal effect to be significant in isolated
parts of the model along with the combined marginal effect being insignificant.
According to the CDC, prescription drug utilization is highest for people age 65 and
older, and there are substantial differences in utilization based on age. I stratified the sample
into three age groups because prescription drug utilization varies largely depending on age,
and lumping everyone in the same sample obscures this heterogeneity (Kantor et al. 2015).
The samples are ages 18-39 (N=186,144), 40-64 (N=180,723) and 65 and older (N=68,168).
Because there are stricter barriers for minors to obtain medical marijuana and the fact that
they are much less likely to have the conditions for which marijuana can be beneficial, I
exclude people younger than 18 from the sample.
6I used STATA's twopm command developed by Belotti et al. 2015 to obtain the combined marginal
effects and their standard errors.
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1.5 Primary Results
Table 2 presents the means of the main outcome variable of opioid spending along
with the drug categories that marijuana can potentially replace for the full sample. Both the
probability of any spending and the amount of spending conditional on positive spending on
opioids and other potentially marijuana substitutable prescriptions are lower in MML states
compared to control states.
To determine whether these differences are driven by MMLs, I estimate two different
models. First, I show results from the models that only include any MML, and in the second
I report the results from the model which only include its provisions. I also report a model
that simultaneously estimates all provisions and MML, but due to collinearity when the fixed
effects are included, I do not report these results as main findings.7
For my analyses I show results from two-part models instead of OLS on the whole
sample for three reasons. First, many people in these samples do not use these prescription
drugs, and two-part models explicitly model this large mass of non-users. Second, the two-
part model yields lower Akaike information criterion. Third, the two-part model gave better
out-of-sample predictions compared to OLS. I also run joint significance tests where the null
hypothesis is the coefficients from the four provisions of MMLs are jointly equal to zero
and report their p-values. I perform these tests for the models that include indicators for all
provisions and an indicator for existence of any MML. The motivation is to test whether these
provisions jointly explain variations which are not captured by a generic MML indicator.
Tables 4 through 6 show the effects of a MML and its provisions on the different
margins of opioid spending among different age groups. According to the results in Table
4, a MML has no discernible effect on the probability of using opioids in young adults (ages
18-39). Although the coefficient on “any MML” is positive, it is insignificant. Similarly,
7Also, the interpretation of “any MML” becomes difficult in this model. These results are available upon
request.
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none of the provisions show any discernible effects. However, there is a significant decrease
in opioid spending on the intensive margin. Namely, among young adult users of opioids
there is a decrease of $37.46 per person over a year associated with the passing of MML,
which translates to a 53.7% decrease from the baseline mean of opioid expenditures. Looking
at the model which includes its provisions we can see that “home cultivation” is the main
driver of this decrease with an even larger and significantly negative effect. Although “retail
dispensary” has negative effects, its coefficient is not precisely estimated. The last two
columns in Table 4 report the combined effects of MML and its provisions on the overall
population bringing the two parts together. Implementation of a MML significantly lowers
opioid spending in the overall population of young adults by $2.47 per person over a year.
Focusing on the effects of individual provisions in states where home cultivation is allowed,
young adults use $4 less of opioids per person holding all other provisions constant. The
“home cultivation” provision appears to be the main driver of the decreasing effect of MML
on opioids among young adults and these effects result from the intensive margin of use.
Tables 5 and 6 show there is not much evidence that a MML and its provisions significantly
change opioid spending among middle age (ages 40-64) and elderly people (ages 65+). The
only significant effect is found among middle age people. Namely, in states where the law
allows retail dispensaries, there is a 1.4% point drop in the probability of using opioids among
this group when we hold the other provisions fixed (a 14% decrease from the baseline mean).
As pointed out by earlier literature, most medical marijuana patients are younger adults so
it makes sense that we see a significant drop in opioid spending among younger populations
and almost no effect among older people.
The above analyses show independent effects of the four provisions, but states have
combinations of these provisions. Table 7 shows linear combinations of the marginal effects
from various combinations of the four provisions for each age group on the overall spending
of opioids consisting of both parts. First, I examine the linear combinations of the marginal
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effects of “home cultivation,” “non-specific pain” and “retail dispensary” provisions. Cali-
fornia is a state with this type of MML. California's type of MML is effective in reducing
opioid spending among young adults by $3.86 per person over a year and has no effect on
older populations. Second, I examine the effects of “retail dispensary,” “home cultivation,”
“non-specific pain” and “patient registry” provisions. Colorado is an example of a state with
such a MML. Colorado's type of MML is effective in reducing opioid spending among young
adults by $3.27 per person over a year. Next, I examine the combined effects of “retail
dispensary,” “non-specific pain” and “patient registry” provisions (New Jersey-type) and
combined effects of “home cultivation,” “non-specific pain” and “patient registry” (Alaska-
type). Both New Jersey's and Alaska's types of MML are not associated with any significant
decreases in reducing opioid spending.
A California-type MML which allows home cultivation, legalizes and protects dispen-
saries, and imposes no restrictions such as having a specific type of pain to be eligible or
requiring a registry of the patient is one of the least strict types of MML.8 It is also the
type of MML that reduces opioid spending the most among young adults, as measured by
the amount of dollar reduction in this study. Although not as loose as California's MML,
Colorado's type of MML is also one of the loosest models and associated with decreases in
opioid spending comparable to California's.
These results from the combined effects of provisions indicate the effects of MML
are not uniform but depend on the different combinations of provisions, consistent with
Pacula et al. (2015). The types of MMLs with the most generous provisions, which include
the protection and allowance of dispensaries with home cultivation, seem to be the most
effective types of MMLs in decreasing spending on opioid prescriptions.
8I also check whether the overall reductions in opioids were driven by California alone. The estimates
from models excluding California show similar and even slightly larger estimates in magnitude. These results
are available upon request.
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1.6 Additional Analyses
Up to this point I have shown that the response of total prescription opioid expendi-
tures to MMLs depends on the age of the users and the margin of use. The point estimates
from combined marginal effects point decreases in spending on prescription opioids associ-
ated with MMLs among young adults. To further assess the validity of this finding, I perform
two types of sensitivity and two other additional analyses by exploring (i) the timing of the
policy implementation and policy endogeneity, (ii) the effects of MMLs on the number of
total opioid pills acquired instead of expenditures, (iii) the effects of MMLs and their provi-
sions on spending on other prescription drugs for which marijuana can potentially be used
as a substitute and (iv) the effects of MMLs and their provisions on prescription drugs for
which MMLs are not supposed to have any effect.
1.6.1 Event studies
Here I replicate my baseline specification with two-part models for expenditures on
opioids adding lead and lag indicators. This flexible event study approach enables me to
investigate whether there are any pre-existing trends in opioid expenditures which are en-
dogenous to MML adoption. Furthermore, it shows if the law has differential effects over
time after a MML is adopted. I exclude the indicator for the last year prior to MML adoption
and set it equal to zero for normalization.
Figure 2 shows the estimated average marginal effects of the timing of the intervention
within four or more years before and after for each age group. The results for young adults
indicate there is a drop in prescription opioid expenditures after a year following the MML
adoption (relative to the year prior to adoption). The decreasing effect of a MML becomes
statistically significant after two years following the year it takes effect and continues to
be significantly negative even after four years or more, with its magnitude reaching its
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maximum after three years. The decreasing impact of MML on opioids among young adults
is persistent over time with the long run difference being even larger than its instantenous
effect. There is not evidence of pre-existing trends: prior to intervention the effect of a MML
is indistinguishable from zero.
Turning to middle age and elderly populations there is not much evidence supporting
the hypothesis that a MML changes prescribed opioid expenditures over time. Among the
elderly population, a MML increases the opioid utilization after the first year of its adoption
(relative to the year prior to adoption), but this estimate is barely significant and it dissipates
the following years. There is not evidence of pre-trends before MML implementation in either
of these age groups.
These results from event study analyses support the main findings that MML imple-
mentation decreases the spending of prescription opioids among young adults but does not
have any discernible effect on older populations.
1.6.2 Effects on total number of opioid pills
So far, all the analyses were concerned with the expenditure outcomes for prescription
opioids. Although total expenditure is an important outcome from a government budget
spending perspective, it is not the only or the most complete measure of utilization. To
investigate whether the spending decreases in opioids associated with MMLs are attributed
to use rather than heterogeneous prescription drug prices, I perform analyses on total number
of prescribed opioid pills purchased using MEPS prescribed medicine files. Despite being an
imperfect measure of utilization, total number of prescribed opioid pills obtained can provide
some insights for the mechanisms of the effects found in main results.
Table 8 shows the average marginal effects of MMLs from two-part models on total
opioid pills for the same age groups. Turning to results for the young adults on Table 8, the
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decreasing effect of “any MML” on opioid utilization remains. Namely, the mere adoption of
MML decreases the number of prescription opioid pills in the young population by 2.16 pills
per person over a year, which is a 27% decrease from the baseline mean. We can see that
decreases from “any MML” on opioids among young adults mainly result from the effects
from “home cultivation” and “retail dispensary” provisions. The effects of MML and its
provisions are null among the older populations when the outcome variable is number of
pills instead of total expenditures.
Comparing these results we see that the effects of MMLs found on opioid pills support
the primary results found on the opioid expenditures: implementation of MML decreases
opioid utilization among young adults.
1.6.3 Effects on the utilization of other prescription drugs
Although the majority of medical marijuana patients report using marijuana for pain,
there exists suggestive evidence on marijuana's effects on other health conditions. Further-
more, Reinerman et al. (2011) report the other common reasons patients cite for using
medical marijuana were muscle spasms, headache and anxiety. Reiman et al. (2017) report
mental health conditions were the second most common reason for using medical marijuana
after pain. In the light of these findings I study the effects of MMLs on other prescription
drugs for which marijuana can be a potential substitute.
The non-opioid prescription drugs I examine fall under four major groups: non-opioid
painkillers, antidepressants, anticonvulsants and sedatives. These categories of drugs are
commonly prescribed and they treat the conditions medical marijuana states render eligible.
They are also examined by earlier studies (Bradford and Bradford 2016 and 2017). If MMLs
are causing people to switch from their prescriptions to medical marijuana, utilization of
these drugs must show the biggest change. However, Bradford and Bradford’s 2016 and 2017
24
analyses only include Medicaid and Medicare recipients who incurred positive expenditures
of prescriptions. Here, l extend the analyses to a broader population.
Tables 9 through 11 show the combined marginal effects of “any MML” and MMLs'
four main provisions on expenditures for other marijuana-substitutable prescriptions for each
age group. The mere implementation of a MML has no impact on other drugs, except a
barely significant spending decrease in sedatives among young adults by $1.47 per person
over a year and a significant decrease in sedatives among the elderly by $6.75 per person
over a year.
Focusing on the effects of the four main provisions of MMLs, “retail dispensary” and
“home cultivation” provisions are generally associated with significant decreases on antide-
pressant and anticonvulsant expenditures among young adults and the elderly. Having a
“non-specific pain” provision in a state's MML is associated with a significant increase in
sedative spending among young adults. This increase in sedative spending results from the
increase in the extensive margin: having a “non-specific pain” provision increases the proba-
bility of sedative use significantly. This could be attributed to “non-specific pain” provision's
creation of ambiguities in eligibility criteria and extension of the patient base to people with
relatively milder pain (or no pain), who later end up being prescribed other prescriptions
upon seeing the physician. In fact, a “non-specific pain” provision also significantly increases
the probability of using antidepressants and anticonvulsants among young adults.9
Having a “patient registry” provision offsets the increasing effects of a “non-specific
pain” provision in young adults' sedative spending by decreasing it by $4.51 per person
over a year. It also decreases the elderly's sedative spending by $10.18 per person over a
year. The decreasing effect of a “patient registry” provision seems odd at first, but it could
be due to three reasons. First, requiring the registration of the patient could make the
recommendation of marijuana less risky from the physician's viewpoint, decreasing her cost
9These results from extensive margin of use from other prescriptions are in Appendix Table 1A.
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of recommending it. Similarly, being registered by the state and having a medical marijuana
patient identification card can decrease the patient's risk of arrest from carrying marijuana.
Looking at tables 9 and 11, it is natural to ask why sedatives are the drug category that is
most sensitive to these provisions in young adults and elderly. As pointed out in Proposition
5 MMLs' effects depend on the “mismatch” (or side effects) associated with a prescription
drug class and the health condition it treats. Sedatives along with opioids are reported to be
a class of drugs with the most severe side effects.10 Furthermore, mental health conditions
and anxiety are found to be the second most commonly reported reason for using medical
marijuana among medical marijuana patients (Reinerman et al. 2011 and Reiman et al.
2017). Therefore, a MML and its provisions can decrease sedative utilization more relative
to other categories of drugs with less severe side effects for which marijuana can substitute.
1.6.4 Placebo tests
Here, I check the effects of MMLs on drug classes for which marijuana has no potential
to substitute. I perform these analyses to demonstrate that negative effects of MML only
exist for the drug classes for which marijuana can be a substitute and not for the other drugs.
Tables 12 through 14 show results for some of the other commonly prescribed drugs on which
MMLs should not have any negative effect. The commonly prescribed placebo drugs include
hormones, hypertension drugs, cardiovascular agents and acid reducers. The results generally
support the hypothesis that MMLs and their provisions do not decrease expenditures on other
drugs, although there are some statistically significant increases, especially with middle age
and elderly people. “Patient registry” is linked with decreasing spending in one of the tests,
although it is only marginally significant at the 10% significance level.
10According to the CDC, sedatives were involved in 31.7% of drug-poisoning ER visits between 2008 and
2011. Hampton et al. 2014 find sedatives made up most of the adverse drug event related ER visits between
2009 and 2011 compared to all other psychiatric medications.
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1.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that implementation of a MML by itself decreases opioid utilization
among young adults significantly, whether utilization is defined as spending or the number of
pills. Most of these reductions result from the intensive margin of utilization. The decreasing
effects of MMLs on opioids among young adults are persistent over time. They continue to
decrease opioid spending among young adults even four or more years after the year of their
implementation. The decreasing effects of MMLs are only observed among young adults
except for the allowance of retail dispensaries which decreases the probability of use among
middle age adults. MMLs also decrease sedative spending among the elderly. Given that
opioids and sedatives are the drug classes associated with the most severe cases of addiction
and adverse drug events, MMLs can be useful in alleviating the problematic use of these
prescriptions. Consistent with the prior literature, ignoring the heterogeneity in MMLs
can mask important effects of their individual provisions. States with the loosest MMLs
experience the biggest reductions in opioid utilization.
Despite growing trends of pro-marijuana policies, there remains a lack of scientific
evidence and consensus as to what extent marijuana affects health in the short and long
terms. Unlike prescription drugs, there are almost no guidelines on how to use marijuana
for medicinal purposes regarding its dosage, type, frequency and the method of its consump-
tion. Although states have been experimenting with different MMLs since 1996, conducting
randomized controlled experiments on marijuana with human subjects remains challenging
given its Schedule 1 categorization by the federal government.
There are several policy implications from this study. First, non-MML states with
high rates of opioid abuse and adverse drug events especially stemming from young adults
should look more carefully into adopting MMLs. Second, MML states should consider the
consequences of having different provisions since MMLs with restrictive supply channels are
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less likely to experience utilization reductions in prescribed opioids or other prescription
drugs, while less restrictive supply policies increase recreational use and abuse as found
by Pacula et al. (2015). This implies states should weigh the pros and cons of different
provisions when they design their MMLs according to their needs. Lastly, more research
is needed to inform policy makers on identifying the characteristics of medical marijuana
patients and why and how they use and substitute it. More randomized clinical trials are
also needed to assess the effects of marijuana on health so that physicians and patients are
more clear on how to use it effectively.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Universal Coverage on
Health Care Utilization: Evidence
from Massachusetts
2.1 Introduction
The price elasticity of health care utilization is a great concern for economists and pol-
icymakers. Although there are a few randomized controlled trials investigating the impact
of cost sharing on health care utilization like the RAND and Oregon health insurance ex-
periments, these studies are outdated or limited to certain populations. Moreover, recent
reforms in health care markets raise questions about the impact of these insurance expan-
sions on utilization and health in the long term. The most recent insurance expansion is the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) which was enacted nationwide in 2014. However, years before
the ACA a very similar health insurance expansion reform took place in Massachusetts in
2006. The goal of the Massachusetts health care reform of 2006 was to achieve universal
health insurance by “incremental universalism”, which meant it would reduce the uninsur-
ance rate by filling the gaps in the existing system rather than ripping up the system and
starting over (Gruber, 2008). According to Gruber, incremental universalism was composed
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of three strategies called the “three-legged stool” which had to be taken together to achieve
universal coverage (Gruber, 2011).
The first leg of the “three-legged stool” strategy was to regulate insurance markets to
extend insurance to people who were previously priced out of the market due to their health.
This meant the insurers were no longer allowed to deny or drop coverage based on pre-existing
conditions or charge differential premiums based on health conditions, except smoking status
and age (community rating) (Kirk, 2000; McDonough et al., 2006, Courtemanche and Zapata,
2014). Massachusetts' health insurance exchange, The Commonwealth Health Insurance
Connector Authority, offered health insurance to those without access to group markets.
The Connector began to enroll people with incomes less than 100% of the federal poverty
line (FPL) in October 2006, then extended enrollment to those with incomes less than 300%
FPL in January 2007, and finally extended it to everyone in May 2007 (Courtemanche and
Zapata, 2014). Also, the reform mandated that family policies must maintain dependent
children for two years past loss of dependency or to age 25 (McDonough et al., 2006).
The first leg alone would result in adverse selection and lead to market failure with very
high premiums which would drive the healthy people out of the market (the death spiral).
Therefore, the second leg of the stool mandated that everyone had to have health insurance
and employers had to offer health insurance to their employees. Individuals without appro-
priate health insurance would face penalties that cost half of the cheapest health insurance
offered through Connector, and employers with more than 10 employees would face penal-
ties costing up to $295 per full-time employee per year unless they offered health insurance.
These mandates took effect in 2007 (Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority,
2008; Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014).
Because these mandates would be very costly to middle and low income individuals, the
third leg of the stool provided subsidies and expanded Medicaid. Health insurance was made
free for people with incomes below 150% FPL and premiums were partially subsidized for
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people with incomes between 150% FLP and 300% FPL with no deductibles. The reform
also mandated that Medicaid would cover children below 300% FPL (McDonough et al.,
2006; Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014). While some of the details were different, both the
ACA and the Massachusetts reform were based on the three-legged stool strategy. However,
Massachusetts had a lower pre-reform uninsured rate compared to other states. 1
There is a rich literature studying how the reform impacted health insurance take-up,
utilization of specific health care service outcomes such as ER visits, and self-assessed health
status. This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, I estimate the
impact of the reform on less-studied utilization outcomes such as counts of prescription drug
purchases, inpatient, outpatient and office visits in addition to ER visits. Second, I examine
the effect of the reform on health care expenditures on the external and internal margins.
Third, I investigate the long run effects of the reform using a dataset with longer pre and
post treatment periods. I find that the reform increased hospital and office visit counts and
expenditures significantly. Namely, I find the reform increased total counts of health care
service events by 1.2 and $942 per person over a year. The reform decreased the counts of
prescription drug purchases, but increased their expenditures. I also find the reform's effects
were not only long-lasting but they got stronger over time. In the long run, the reform
increased counts of all health care service events significantly including prescription drug
purchases.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on Massachusetts'
health care reform. Section 3 describes the data, and provides a motivation for the identi-
fication strategy. Section 4 further explains the identification strategy and model selection.
Section 5 discusses the primary results. Section 6 presents several robustness checks to test
the sensitivity of the main results, validate the assumptions of the identification strategy,
1Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) lays out a systematic review comparing the two reforms.
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and examine the differential effects of the reform over time. Section 7 briefly summarizes
the findings and discusses a direction for future research based on the findings.
2.2 Literature Review
Many papers have studied the effects of the Massachusetts health care reform on various
outcomes. Long et al. (2009) found the reform decreased the uninsured rate by 6.6 percentage
points in non-elderly adults. Long and Stockley (2011) found the Massachusetts reform
decreased unmet needs because of cost and delays in obtaining care for the low-income
population. It also increased use of health care for this population. According to Yelowitz
and Cannon (2010), while the reform expanded the coverage overall, it reduced the private
insurance coverage for the population that the reform targeted for government programs and
had little effect on self- assessed health. Cogan et al. (2010) found that after the reform
employer-sponsored insurance premiums increased by 6% compared to other states. Kolstad
and Kowalski (2012) examine the effects of the reform on many outcomes. They show that
the reform decreased the uninsured rate, length of stay in the hospital (especially for long
stays) and emergency room admissions (especially among the poor population). The reform
also decreased visits for preventable conditions. Miller (2012a) uses variation both across
counties and states and finds that counties with a relatively more uninsured rate pre-reform
experienced a larger increase in the insured rate. She also found that it reduced ER visits
for the conditions that can be treated in a physician's office and the conditions that can
be prevented with routine care. Miller (2012b) examined the effects on children's outcomes
and found that the reform increased probability a child had any insurance, decreased the
probability a child had an ER visit, increased the probability a child had an office visit and
check-up and increased the probability that child was in excellent health. Courtemanche and
Zapata (2014) examined a dataset with longer pre-and-post reform periods and found that
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the reform increased both overall self-assessed health status and less subjective determinants
of health status.
To sum up, most of the earlier literature focused on the outcomes of health, insurance
rate, and utilization of specific services such as ER visits. To my knowledge, only Long et al.
(2008) separately examined the effects on other health care utilization outcomes such as out-
of-pocket spending for prescription drugs. In their paper, they compared the outcomes for a
cross-sectional sample of a non-elderly population just prior to the reform to another cross-
sectional sample of the same population right after the reform. They reported a significant
decrease in out-of-pocket spending for health care and this decrease was largely driven by the
decrease in prescription drug costs. This reduction was most prominent among low-income
individuals.
Understanding changes in out-of-pocket payments due to the reform is key to under-
stand its costs and benefits due to consumption smoothing. The RAND health insurance
experiment in the 1970's found that more generous insurance plans increased spending on
pharmaceuticals (Leibowitz et al., 1985). Finkelstein et al. (2012) used lottery selection in
a randomized Oregon Medicaid expansion as an instrument for insurance and found that
insurance coverage increased the probability of taking any prescription drugs. In addition,
both the RAND and Oregon experiments showed that cost sharing increased health care
utilization. The results from RAND showed that cost sharing increased the number of med-
ical contacts (Manning et al. 1987). The Oregon experiment showed that having insurance
was associated with an increase in the probability of any hospital admissions that do not
originate from ER and increases in hospital days, total list charges and number of proce-
dures performed (Finkelstein et al. 2102). The Massachusetts reform provides another way
to examine the relationship between insurance and health care utilization as well as show
the longer-term impacts of having health insurance on health care utilization.
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The purpose of this essay is to find whether Massachusetts' health care reform changed to-
tal use of and spending on health care services. This paper will extend the existing literature
by examining the long-term impacts of universal coverage on prescription drug utilization as
well as other health care utilization. The results can shed light on the mechanisms through
which the reform led to better health, a consistent finding in this literature.
2.3 Data
I estimate the effect of the reform on health care utilization using the unrestricted version
of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a set of large-scale surveys of families and
individuals and their medical providers in the United States. The MEPS is suitable for my
analysis because it collects data on demographic characteristics, income, and insurance cov-
erage as well as health care services including prescription medicines, inpatient, outpatient,
medical provider office visits and ER visits each time they are utilized and their related ex-
penditures. More detailed information including the type, payment and source of payment
for each utilization event is also collected by their medical providers. I use MEPS waves
from 2000 to 2015 which enables me to uncover the long-term effect of the reform on health
care utilization as well as pre-reform trends. I acquired state-identifiers of MEPS from the
Agency of Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ) to add state controls.
I construct the sample by pooling all years between 2000-2015 from the MEPS consoli-
dated household files which are merged to event-level files from their health care use events.
The treatment group consists of individuals living in Massachusetts and the control group is
the rest of the country. Because the reform prevented people with Medicare from purchasing
insurance through the Connector (Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, 2006) it did not
change health insurance coverage for the elderly. Following prior literature (e.g. Long, 2008;
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Miller, 2011a; Yelowitz and Cannon 2010; Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014) I only include
the non-elderly population ages 18 to 64.
The main health care utilization outcomes include total counts of and total expenditures
on prescription drugs and, inpatient, outpatient, office and ER visits utilized by an individual
over a year. I will also aggregate all these events both at the count and expenditure level and
estimate the effect of the reform on total utilization. It is important to estimate both the
count and the expenditure of the health care utilization outcomes because estimating only
the effect on expenditures alone would not tell us whether the reform affected utilization
or prices. Therefore, the main outcome variables for utilization must be captured by the
number of counts of utilization events. Estimating the expenditures after knowing the effects
of the reform on the counts of utilization can then give an idea whether the law changed
prices and whether it resulted in increases or decreases in overall health care expenditures.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 compare means for the other 50 control states (49 states and District
of Columbia) in the pretreatment years between 2000 to 2005 for the independent and
dependent variables, respectively. Before the reform, residents in other states purchased
more prescriptions drugs and spent more on them than Massachusetts residents. However,
Massachusetts residents on average had significantly more counts of outpatient and office
visits. They were also more likely to use any health care service before the reform. Also,
Massachusetts residents were on average more educated, less likely to be unemployed, more
likely to be a student, and more likely to have high incomes compared to residents living in
other states. I will use a difference-in-difference estimator to account for these pre-reform
differences in utilization outcomes while conditioning on a rich set of controls.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the average values of the total health care service counts and
dollar spending in Massachusetts and the control states every year from 2000 to 2015, along
with their 95% confidence intervals, respectively. These healthcare measures are the totals
of prescription drug purchases, inpatient, outpatient, medical-provider office and ER visits.
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According to Figures 2.1 and 2.2, both the total counts of health care service and spending
were very similar in Massachusetts compared to rest of the country before the reform. After
2006, there is a gap between Massachusetts and other states where Massachusetts experienced
an increase in health care service spending and use. This increase is more apparent in total
count measure and the trend seems to be upward, whereas in other states the trend is
generally stable over time. There is an increasing trend in Massachusetts which is steeper
than rest of the country and the resulting gap reaches its maximum in 2012 for both count
and spending outcomes.
Next, I conduct regression analyses to more formally investigate whether the health care
use in Massachusetts relative to the control states was a causal response to health care reform
to support the preliminary findings from Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
2.4 Regression Analysis
I start with estimating the effect of the reform on health care service use counts with
negative binomial models employing a difference-in-difference strategy. For my main anal-
ysis, I use the counts of utilization in prescription drugs (each time a prescription drug is
purchased), inpatient hospital visits, outpatient hospital visits, medical-provider office visits,
ER visits and total counts of all these utilizations. For the primary results, I report aver-
age marginal effects from a negative binomial model specification due to the health service
use count data being discrete and extremely skewed to the right. The reason I prefer the
marginal effects from the negative binomial model as the primary results is because it has
fewer restrictions on the mean-variance relationship compared to Poisson.2 The conditional
2Marginal effects from Poisson are also reported to compare with the main results in Appendix Table
A2.1.
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mean expectation for the negative binomial is given by;
E[countiast|µiast, α] = µiast (2.1)
where i, a, s and t are indices for individual, health care service type, state and year respec-
tively, count is the count of use/purchase for health care service a, α is the overdispersion
coefficient and
µiast = exp(δ0 + δ1MAs + δ2Postt + δ3MAs ∗ Postt + δ4X ′ist + θs + ρt + θsρt) (2.2)
where MAs is a dummy variable which indicates the person lives in Massachusetts. Postt
is a dummy that turns to one on and after 2006. X
′
ist consists of all the person-level control
variables that are listed in Table 2.1. θs and ρt are state and year fixed effects and θsρt
denotes the state-specific linear time trends which control for unobserved state-level factors
that evolve linearly with time. I use the above difference-in-difference identification strategy
for health care outcomes with the appropriate models for count and expenditure measures.
This DD strategy assumes that in the absence of the reform changes over the health care
service counts and expenditures would have been the same in Massachusetts and the control
states, conditional on the control variables. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 provide preliminary support
for this assumption. Therefore, I use all other states as the control group in main analyses.
I will later consider alternative control states in the robustness checks section.
Next, I estimate how the reform affected health care counts and expenditures using two-
part models (or hurdle models for count outcomes). The reasons for using two-part models
are both due to the shape of the health care utilization distribution and the nature of the
decision-making processes that go into health care utilization which typically involve different
agents at different margins of utilization. There is a large portion of the sample with no
37
health care use and the two-part model does not assume the covariates affect the decisions
to use any health care and the amount of use or spending (conditional on any use/spending)
similarly. I first report the average marginal effects from the probit model shown below
which shows how the reform affected the probability of health care use for each health care
service category conditional on controls.
Pr(yiast > 0|X) = Φ(γ0 + γ1MAs + γ2Postt + γ3MAs ∗ Postt + γ4X ′ist + ωs + υt + ωsυt)
(2.3)
Later, I report the second part of the model to show how the reform changed health care
spending for those who use health care services. In the second part, I use GLM with log link
and negative binomial family for the count outcomes and log link and gamma family for the
spending outcomes given below to deal with the high skewness that is present in the health
care expenditure distribution. The conditional mean expectation of the second part of the
model is given below;
E[yiast|yiast > 0|X) = exp(α0 + γ1MAs + α2Postt + α3MAs ∗ Postt + α4X ′ist + λs + τt + λsτt)
(2.4)
Finally, I combine the effect sizes from both parts of the two-part model and report the
combined average marginal effect of the reform.
E[yiast|X] = Pr(yiast|X > 0)× E[yiast > 0, X] (2.5)
It is important to mention that I report average marginal effects of the interactions of
treatment and time (MAs ∗ Postt). Puhani 2012 shows that when the treatment effect is
the parameter of interest it is right to focus on the marginal effect of the interaction term.
38
The standard errors in all regressions are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by state
unless otherwise specified. I will more formally investigate whether the standard errors are
underestimated in main analyses in the robustness checks section.
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 presents results from the preferred model. These negative binomial regression
estimates of the effect of the reform on health care service counts are all significant. The
reform increased all types of health care service counts of inpatient, outpatient, office and,
ER visits significantly by 0.03, 0.3, 0.8 and 0.05 counts per person over a year respectively.
The reform decreased the counts of prescription purchases significantly by 0.6 counts per
person over a year. When I aggregate all types of utilization counts at the person-year level,
I find that the reform is associated with a significant increase in total health care counts
of utilization by 1.2 counts per person over a year. Table 2.4 repeats the analyses using
hurdle models which separately estimate the extensive and intensive parts of utilization due
to the large mass of zero utilization counts present in the data and the nature of the decision
process where the decisions at these two margins are likely to be made by different agents
(self vs. the physician). The combined average marginal effects from the hurdle models are
very similar to the preferred model estimates from the negative binomial, pointing that the
reform increased counts of health care service use for all types, but decreased prescription
drug purchase counts significantly.
Next, I estimate the effects of the reform on health care expenditures using the two-part
model. Table 2.5 shows combined average marginal effects for the full sample on expenditures
for all the types of health care services. I find the reform increased the expenditures on
prescription drug purchases, inpatient, outpatient, office and ER visits by $204, $386, $204,
$229 and $85 for a Massachusetts resident over a year. It is also associated with a $942
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increase in total health care expenditures for a person over a year. Note that these are the
combined marginal effects encompassing both the external and internal margins of spending.
It is possible that the reform's effects on these two different margins are different in direction
and magnitude. Therefore, I report the reform's isolated effects on both of those margins
separately in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. According to results on the extensive margin of spending (or
use) in Table 2.7 the reform increased the probabilities of using prescriptions and attending
inpatient, outpatient, office and ER visits by 3.6, 1.5, 8.8, 6.8 and 4.5 percentage points,
respectively. Additionally, the reform increased the likelihood of having any of these health
services by 5.7 percentage points.
I then turn to the intensive margin of spending in Table 2.7. The reform is again found to
be associated with significant increases along this margin. Specifically, the reform led to the
following increases per person over a year: $277 increase in prescription drug expenditures
among prescription users, $1855 increase in inpatient visit expenditures among people with
any inpatient visits, $243 increase in outpatient visit expenditures among people with any
outpatient visits, $271 increase in office visit expenditures among people with any office visits,
and $241 increase in ER visit expenditures among those with any ER visits. The reform
increased total health care spending by $1113 per person over a year among people who used
any of these health care services. Note that these expenditures represent total expenditures
and include out-of-pocket payments and any amount paid by insurance regardless of the
insurance type. According to the results from the extensive and intensive margins, we
can see that the combined effects of the reform on health care spending are a result of
both of these margins. The significance and the magnitudes of the combined effects are
driven by the increases in both parts of the model. The effects found from the two-part
model on expenditures may be attributed to increases in use as well as increases in prices
(or both). Although I find the reform decreased the counts of prescription purchases, it
increased both the probability of using prescriptions and prescription spending conditional
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on any prescription spending. This can be due to several reasons. First, it could be that as
a result of the reform people may have switched from less expensive prescriptions to more
expensive prescriptions while buying less of them. It could also be the simple result of people
purchasing prescriptions in bulk amounts resulting in fewer counts of prescription purchase
events. Another explanation could be that the reform might have increased prescription
drug prices.
2.6 Robustness Checks
This section investigates the validity of the assumption that the rest of the nation is a
valid counterfactual to Massachusetts by trying different sets of control states. All these
estimations are done for count outcomes using negative binomial regressions. The first
control group consists of 10 states that have the most similar pretreatment utilization counts
for each type of health care service. The second control group consists of 10 states with
the most similar pretreatment trends to Massachusetts. These control states are found by
regressing each health care utilization count on year for each state between 2000 and 2005
and picking the 10 states with the most similar slopes to Massachusetts' slope. Third, I
use a control group which consists of 10 states with the most similar insurance coverage to
Massachusetts before the reform. The fourth control group consists of other New England
states due to their geographical proximity to Massachusetts. Finally, I use a synthetic control
method developed by Abadie et al. (2010) by aggregating data to the state-year level and
letting the data assign weights to each state (after including the control variables) so that
when they are used together they will give the closest match to Massachusetts before the
reform. After obtaining these weights, I multiplied them by the MEPS sampling weights
for individuals. Tables 2.8 to 2.12 show results of these robustness checks for each type of
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health care service count utilized. The standard errors in these models are clustered by the
state-year level since the samples cover fewer states (11 or less in most cases).
The robustness checks using alternative control groups from Tables 2.8 through 2.12 give
significant results for MAs ∗ Postt for the most part, and the ranges of the estimates are
close to the main result from Table 2.3. For prescription drug events, except the group which
only consists of New England states, the coefficients are all negative, with estimates ranging
from -1.27 to -0.09. The main model estimate is within this range. However, compared to
residents of other New England states, Massachusetts residents increased the counts of their
prescription purchases by 2.2 after the reform. For inpatient visit outcomes, different control
groups give estimates ranging from 0.0926 to 0.3 which is consistent with the result from
the main specification, although the main result is on the conservative side of this range.
For outpatient visit counts, all specifications give significant and positive estimates ranging
from 0.83 to 0.149, with the main estimate falling on the conservative side (0.328). Office
visit estimates range from 3.4 to 0.96 so the main estimate of 0.84 is closer to the lower end.
ER visit estimates range from 0.0382 to 0.0683 with the main estimate being 0.05 falling in
the estimates range. The estimates for the total counts of utilization events range from 6.4
to 1.6 although not always significant. The main estimate is 1.183 which is less than any of
these estimates but significant.
2.6.1 Event Study
In this section, I replicate my baseline specification adding more interaction terms. Fol-
lowing Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) I split the years before and after 2006 into sections.
I create indicators of five time periods: “early before” defined as the years between 2000-
2002, “late before” defined as the years between 2003-2005, “during” defined as years of 2006
and 2007, “early after” defined as the years between 2008-2010 and “late after” defined as
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the years after 2010. I interact these indicators with MAs indicator except for “early before”
which serves as the reference period. This flexible event study type approach investigates
whether there are any pre-existing trends that are so unique to Massachusetts that no other
state or combination of states can accurately be used as a counterfactual. Also, it shows if
the reform had differential effects on utilization count outcomes depending on time. It is
plausible to expect an immediate increase in utilization right after the passage of the reform
especially if there was a pent-up demand, or it could also be the case that the full effects of
the reform come into play later in time as the spillovers (i.e. knowledge spillovers, diffusion
of competition in health care markets) of the reform may take time to materialize.
Table 2.13 displays the average marginal effect estimates for the interaction terms.
The coefficient of “MA*early after” and “MA*late after” are all significant and positive.
“MA*during” is also significant and positive for all outcomes except prescription drugs. The
coefficient of “MA*late before” is significant and positive in inpatient and ER visit counts
although these coefficients are very small. The average marginal effects of “MA*late before”
on office visit counts and total utilization counts are significant and negative implying that
there was already a different trend in Massachusetts just a few years before the reform took
effect. Despite these significant coefficients on “MA*late before”, the reform's increasing
effects grew over time reaching the maximum after 2010. The marginal effects of “MA*late
after” are approximately twice the size of the marginal effects of “MA*early after” and
“MA*during”. This implies the increases in utilization in response to the reform were fully
realized four years after its implementation.
2.6.2 Tests Related to Inference
In this section, I investigate whether the DD estimator understates the standard errors.
The results found in this paper can be driven by understated standard errors especially
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given the treatment variable does not change within a state over time. This can cause sev-
eral problems in inference as pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004). To test whether the
increases in utilization are still significant after aggregation of the data I collapse all data into
a state-level panel with three time periods – before, during (2006-2007) and after, interact
them with MA and regress the state average utilization on MA*during and MA*after with
state and period fixed effects. Second, I collapse data into two cross-sectional units of Mas-
sachusetts and other states, define the same period dummies as the previous inference test,
then regress averages of health care service counts on MA*during, MA*after, MA dummy
and year fixed effects. Tables A2.2 and A2.3 present the results from these specifications.
MA*After remains statistically significant and positive in both regressions despite the small
sample size except inpatient visit counts.
2.6.3 Instrumental Variables
Following Courtemanche and Zapata (2014), I conduct an instrumental variables estima-
tion by using MAs ∗ Postt as an instrument to estimate the impact of insurance on health
care service use counts. This approach assumes that the reform affects health care utilization
only by granting insurance on the extensive margin of providing insurance conditional on
controls. As pointed out by Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) this assumption rules out the
effect of switching across insurance plans on the intensive margin on health care utilization.
This assumption would also not hold if the reform caused other changes in the health care
system or spillovers which would then affect health care utilization. Despite these concerns,
instrumenting with MAs ∗ Postt for insurance gives estimates on the effects of the reform
through the insurance path, if it was the only channel through which the reform affected
health care utilization.
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For the first stage of the instrumental variables estimation, I use a linear probability
model as shown below to estimate the effect of the reform on insurance coverage;
insist = β0 + β1MAs + β2Postt + β3MAs ∗ Postt + pi4X ′ist + σs + ψt + σsψt + εist (2.6)
where insist is a binary variable if the person i living in state s in year t had insurance
coverage. Because I am using negative binomial models I use the two-stage residual inclusion
(2SRI) approach, which includes the residuals from the first stage as a regressor in the second
stage. Terza et al. (2008) show that when the second stage of the instrumental variables
estimation is a nonlinear function this approach gives consistent estimates. The second stage
is given by;
E[countiast|µist, α] = exp(pi0 + pi1insist + pi2uˆist + β3X ′ist + θs + ρt + θsρt) (2.7)
where uˆist denotes the residuals from the first stage regression. I calculated the asymptotic
standard errors with the formula given in Terza (2011).
The estimated coefficient pˆi1 gives the local average treatment effect of insurance for those
who gained insurance as a result of the reform. This does not represent the average treat-
ment effect of insurance since people did not randomly gain coverage due to the reform.
Table 2.14 reports the coefficient estimates from the first and second stages of instrumental
variables estimation. According to the estimate on the first stage, the reform is associated
with a 5.3 percentage point increase in coverage. Turning to the second stage results, ob-
taining insurance leads to statistically significant increases in all but one health care service
outcome. Specifically, having insurance is estimated to increase counts of prescription pur-
chases, inpatient visits, outpatient visits, ER visits and total health care use counts by 8.4,
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0.08, 0.45, 0.06 and 12.6 per person over a year respectively. Having insurance increases
outpatient visit counts but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the effect of health care reform in Massachusetts on use of
health care services using MEPS data. A negative binomial difference-in-difference analysis
showed that the reform increased the counts of inpatient, outpatient, office, and ER visits
significantly. I find that the reform was associated with decreases in counts of prescription
drug purchases. Overall, it significantly increased total utilization of health care services
measured in counts of health care events. These results were robust to using different func-
tional forms and alternative control groups. I also examined the effect of the reform on
the probability of use and amount of dollar spending. I found that the reform increased
all of these outcomes significantly. Although I find the reform decreased prescription drug
purchase counts, the reform was associated with increased probability of using prescriptions
on the extensive margin and more prescription spending on the intensive margin. This can
mean either the reform changed the prescription drug prices, or people switched their pre-
scriptions to more expensive from less expensive while using them less, or people simply
purchased them in bulk amounts, decreasing their counts of purchases. I also found evidence
that the increasing effects of the reform grew over time, especially after 2010, doubling its
initial impact. Finally, I used the reform as an instrument for health insurance coverage and
estimated large and positive impacts of coverage on utilization.
To sum up, I show that the reform was mostly associated with increased use of hospital
and office visits. However, I do not examine which types of health care service visits were
impacted the most, or outcomes of length of stay, or the prescription drug types. The results
found in this paper should be taken with the results from prior literature. Kolstad and
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Kowalski (2012) showed that the reform decreased the number of inpatient visits originated
from ER as well as hospitalizations for preventible conditions. They also found the reform
increased the utilization of preventive services. Miller (2012) found a decrease in nonurgent
ER visits. The findings from this paper can provide evidence that the gains in self-assessed
health documented by earlier literature (Courtemanche and Zapata 2014) are likely real,
rather than due to the “warm-glow” effect documented in the Oregon experiment literature.
Future research should focus on what specific conditions were responsible for the increase
in health care services as well as examining whether the effects differed across different
populations.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of the Affordable Care
Act on Health Care Utilization
3.1 Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is a United States federal statute
enacted on March 23, 2010. The ACA aims to attain nearly universal health insurance
coverage. This goal would be achieved through a combination of mandates, regulations
on insurers, expanding Medicaid subsidies and health insurance exchanges. Most of these
major provisions of the ACA were implemented in 2014. Studies show that the ACA led to
increased health insurance coverage (Frean et al. 2016, Courtemanche et al. 2016, 2017 and
2018). The goal of this paper is to investigate whether the ACA led to any changes in health
care utilization through increasing insurance coverage.
In order to reach and sustain universal coverage, the ACA imposed three major compo-
nents which simultaneously supported each other known as “the three-legged stool”. The
first component regulated and reformed the non-group insurance markets so that consumers
without access to employer-provided or public coverage would have access to coverage. These
reforms included going from experience rating to community rating, guaranteed issue, and
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minimum coverage requirements as well as setting up marketplaces to foster competition
among insurance plans.
Because these reforms would incentivize high-risk consumers to enroll and drive up the
premiums leading to an adverse selection death spiral the second leg of the three-legged stool
was implemented. The second leg mandated that individuals without coverage would be
penalized. The penalty was also imposed on employees with more than 100 employers unless
they covered at least 95% of their full-time employees and their dependents (Courtemanche
et al. 2017).
Mandating individuals and employees to pay for health insurance would bring the afford-
ability problem. The third leg of the stool aimed to solve this problem by making insurance
more affordable through providing subsidies for individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid
or other sources of affordable insurance and expanding Medicaid in states which opted to
expand via the ACA.
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the effect of the ACA both with and
without the Medicaid expansion on health care utilization. The health care utilization out-
comes include prescription drug, inpatient, outpatient, office-based medical provider, and
emergency room (ER) utilization.
We separately estimate the effects of the ACA's non-Medicaid and Medicaid portions
by using a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) strategy, with the differences coming
from time, state Medicaid expansion status, and person's treatment status where the treat-
ment is defined as the insurance status of the person in 2013. In other words, the treatment
variable is a binary indicator that turns to 1 if the person was uninsured in 2013 and 0
otherwise. Due to the two-year panel structure of MEPS, we are only able to capture the
changes between two years using the person's treatment status. However, not all insurance
take-up happened in 2014, but there were continued coverage gains in 2015 (Frean et al.
2017, Diamond et al. 2018). We also estimate the effects of the ACA using the same strat-
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egy for the years of 2014 and 2015 by re-defining our treatment variable as the insurance
status of the person in 2014. This will give us the effects of the Medicaid and non-Medicaid
portions of the ACA between 2014 and 2015.
We find that the ACA resulted in significant increases in total health care utilization
counts in its first year between 2013 and 2014. Specifically, we find that the ACA increased
use of inpatient and office-based medical provider visits significantly in the 2013-2014 sam-
ple. The increase in total counts of health care use was barely significant between 2014-2015
although we find that the full ACA increased health insurance coverage in this period sig-
nificantly with a magnitude very similar to its effect in its first year.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Effects of Health Insurance on Health Care Utilization
The effect of health insurance on health care utilization has been an important topic
in the literature. Causal evidence comes from a variety of observational and randomized
controlled studies. The first of those was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) of
the 1970's and 1980's which randomly assigned people to health insurance programs with
varying levels of cost-sharing. The study found that “a catastrophic insurance plan reduces
expenditures 31% relative to zero out-of-pocket price” (Manning et al. 1987). They found
that cost sharing increased the number of medical contacts, rather than the intensity of each
contact. In 2008 Oregon's Medicaid granted a lottery in which randomly selected uninsured
low-income adults in Oregon could enroll in Medicaid. Finkelstein et al. (2012) found
the treatment group which was selected by the lottery experienced a 25 percentage point
increase in the probability of being insured compared to the control group that was not
selected. The authors found that in its first year the experiment led to significantly higher
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health care utilization and lower out-of-pocket expenditures. Namely, the Oregon health
experiment found that having insurance was associated with an increase in the probability
of any hospital admissions that do not originate from ER and increases in hospital days,
total list charges and numbers of procedures performed. Another study by Taubman et al.
(2014) studied Oregon health experiment and found that the Medicaid coverage increased
ER visits.
There is also evidence from non-experimental settings. These results mainly come from
studies involving Medicaid and Medicare. Dafny and Gruber (2005) explore the impact
of the Medicaid expansion that occurred between 1983-1996 on child hospitalizations and
find that the Medicaid expansions increased hospitalizations significantly among children.
Lichtenberg (2002) and Card et al. (2008) find that Medicare eligibility increased health
care utilization.
More recent evidence on the effect of insurance of health care utilization comes from
the effects of ACA's dependent coverage provision which took effect in 2010 and mandated
insurers to cover dependents up to 26 years old. Papers that studied health care utilization
mostly find increases associated with the mandate. Sommers et al. (2012) found evidence
of an increase in access to care, and reductions in the number of young adults who delayed
getting care and for those who did not get care because of costs. Akosa Antwi et al. (2015)
report that the mandate was associated with an increase in inpatient visits, especially for
mental health conditions. Barbaresco et al. (2015) found that the mandate was associated
with increases in the probabilities of having a primary care doctor, and reporting excellent
health and a reduction in BMI. They also report ACA increased risky-drinking but did not
find any evidence it affected preventive care utilization. Chua and Sommers (2014) examined
the drug utilization change due to the provision and did not find any significant changes.
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3.2.2 Effects of the 2014 Affordable Care Act
In order to understand the effect of having health insurance on health care utilization
with evidence from the ACA we first need to know whether there is evidence that the
ACA leads to increases in health insurance coverage. The existing literature using different
data and methods all point to the ACA indeed increasing health insurance coverage. The
earlier evidence comes from basic pre-post comparisons at the national level. These studies
find the ACA resulted in a 2.8 to 6.9 percentage point increase in coverage depending on
the data, the time span and the population (Long et al. 2014, Smith and Medalia 2015,
Courtemanche et al. 2016, Obama 2016, Barnett and Vornovitsky 2016, McMorrow et al.
2016). Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference model which exploits state-level variation
in the Medicaid expansion portion of the ACA and the pre-treatment uninsured rates in local
areas, Courtemanche et al. (2017) find that the ACA with the Medicaid expansion increased
health insurance coverage by 5.9 percentage points. They find that the ACA without the
Medicaid expansion increased health insurance coverage by 2.8 percentage points. Frean et
al. (2017) provide evidence on the effects of various components of the ACA by exploiting
variations in income, geography and time. Their model examines public and private coverage
expansions as well as the individual mandate. They report that their model explains 60%
of the coverage gains in 2014 and 2015.
Recent literature on the effects of the ACA is not limited to health insurance coverage.
Kaestner et al. (2018) find that the ACA with the Medicaid expansion had important
financial impacts by reducing the number of unpaid bills and the amount of debt sent to
third-party agencies. Wherry and Miller (2016) find that in the second half of 2014 the
Medicaid portion of the ACA increased health insurance by 7.4 percentage points among
adults. They report that Medicaid expansions resulted in significant increases in physician
visits in general practice, overnight hospital stays, rates of diabetes and high cholesterol
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diagnoses. Shartzer et al. (2015), Polsky et al. (2015), Kirby and Vistnes (2016), Sommers
et al. (2015), Sommers and Blendon (2015), and Courtemanche et al. (2018) find the ACA
improved access to care. Simon et al. (2017) find that the Medicaid expansions of the ACA
increased insurance coverage and access to care among the targeted population of low-income
childless adults and improved self-assessed health. Courtemanche et al. (2018) find that the
ACA improved self-assessed health among older non-elderly adults. Goldman et al. (2018)
found that the ACA was associated with reduced out-of-pocket spending for medical care,
particularly among lower-income people.
A few recent studies have analyzed changes in health care utilization and spending in
2014, though none of them estimate the causal impact of the full ACA. Nikpay et al. (2016)
and Selden et al. (2016) conduct pre-post analyses. Simon et al. (2016) estimate the causal
impact of the Medicaid expansion alone. In contrast, this paper estimates the causal im-
pacts of both the public and private components of the ACA on utilization and spending.
The previous studies examined a relatively narrow range of utilization outcomes: uninsured
hospitalizations (Nikpay et al., 2016), office visits and ER visits (Selden et al. 2016), and
certain forms of preventive care (Simon et al. 2017). Sommers et al. (2017) showed evidence
from low-income populations of Kentucky, Arkansas and Texas that the ACA significantly
increased preventive health visits, and among people with chronic conditions it increased
regular care for these conditions and medication adherence. We examine additional cate-
gories, such as prescription drugs and outpatient visits, as well as total spending. Finally,
we will expand on these studies by including the second year of post-treatment data.
There are many channels through which the ACA can affect health care utilization. By
increasing insurance coverage, the ACA can directly improve access to health care leading to
an increase in demand. On the other hand, having health insurance can decrease utilization
in the long run by causing improvements in healthy behaviors and increasing preventive care.
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Having health insurance can also lead to risky health behaviors via moral hazard and income
effects which can in turn lead to increase in health care utilization in the long term.
The primary purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of the ACA's 2014 provisions
on a variety of outcomes related to health care utilization. In addition, this paper examines
differential effects resulting from differences in Medicaid expansion decisions of the states.
The secondary contribution of this paper is to estimate the effects of ACA's different portions
by assigning the treatment variable on the individual level. This identification strategy has
advantages compared to other strategies used in the literature before. First, unlike the studies
which used the difference-in-difference strategy, it does not make the assumption that the
states which expanded Medicaid and those that did not must have the same counterfactuals
and trends. This assumption is strong given the political nature of the Medicaid expansion
decisions of the states. It is likely that the unobserved determinants of these state decisions
are correlated with the determinants of our outcome variables such as insurance coverage and
health care utilization. The identification strategy used in this paper also has advantages
over the DDD strategy employed by Courtemanche et al. (2017, 2018) which used the pre-
ACA local area uninsured rates as the measure of treatment exposure of the individual. Our
treatment status comes from the person's observed pre-ACA insurance status as opposed to
the pre-ACA insurance status of the local area in which he lives. In other words, it does
not make the assumption that the treatment status of the individual is correlated with his
location's exposure to the treatment, where this exposure is assumed to be proportional
to its pre-ACA uninsured rate. The identification strategy in this paper readily takes the
individual's own insurance status pre-ACA as the treatment.
We use AHRQ's Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) with state-identifiers be-
tween 2011-2015, with the sample restricted to individuals between 19 and 64 years of age.
We use the MEPS because it includes detailed information on a wide range of health care
utilization outcomes for a sample that is representative of U.S population.
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Our results suggest that the implementation of the full ACA including the Medicaid
expansion increased total counts of health care use significantly only in its first year. We
find that the full ACA specifically increased inpatient and medical-provider office visit use
significantly in its first year. Between 2014 and 2015, the full ACA is associated with increases
in total counts of health care use and total counts of prescription purchases but these results
are only significant at the 10% level.
3.3 Data
Our primary data source is the 2011-2015 waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS). The MEPS consists of a nationally representative subsample of U.S households
that participated in the previous year's National Health Interview Survey. MEPS has an
overlapping panel design, with each household participating in 5 rounds of interviews that
take place over a 2.5-year period. After completing the survey, MEPS obtains permission
from the respondent to contact their medical providers, resulting in detailed information
on dates, charges, and sources of payments that enables the computation of health care
utilization variables for each person in each year.
We consider a wide range of outcomes. Categories of utilization will include counts of
physician and non-physician office visits; inpatient, outpatient, and emergency room visits;
and prescription drugs. For each category, we measure both frequencies of use (e.g. number
of visits, number of prescriptions filled) and expenditures in the past twelve months. Our
primary utilization outcome is the count of health care service utilized for these outcomes.
Before we examine the effects of the ACA on health care utilization we will turn to
estimate its effects on health insurance coverage since this is the primary channel through
which the ACA should influence utilization. Later, we will examine the ACA's effects on
total counts on five main health care types for outcomes: office visits, ER visits, inpatient
55
visits, outpatient visits and prescription drugs. We also look at the effects on total numbers
of these utilizations as the total counts of these events. Finally, we will examine the effects
on expenditure outcomes for these same dimensions of care. It is reasonable to expect that
gaining health insurance can immediately increase health care utilization especially if there
is a pent-up demand specifically for the newly insured individuals. However, Finkelstein et
al. (2012) show one-year estimates of providing health insurance from the Oregon health
insurance experiment and report that they do not find any evidence of a large immediate
utilization effect of pent-up demand. O’Malley et al. (2016) look at the utilization outcomes
for ER and primary care visits for enrollees in the Oregon health insurance experiment and
find that primary care visit rates were higher initially (4-12 months) compared to the second
year. They conclude that the effect of health insurance expansion on utilization depends on
the timing and the prior health insurance coverage of the new enrollees. This paper can shed
light on to whether this “pent-up” demand exists by comparing the effects of the ACA on
both insurance take-up and utilization between the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 panels of the
MEPS.
The MEPS contains demographic information that will enable the inclusion of a set
of control variables. Such controls will include indicators for race/ethnicity (white, black,
Hispanic, or other), income (poor, near poor, low income, middle income, or high income),
education (less than high school, high school, some college, 4-year degree or greater), gender,
marital status, age, and number of children in the home. The MEPS also contains a series of
event-level information for the surveyed individuals on prescribed medicines, inpatient visits,
outpatient visits, ER visits and medical-provider office visits. These event-level observations
represent a unique utilization event and they include detailed information on utilization and
expenditures. We aggregate these events by year and individual level and match this aggre-
gated event data with individual-level data by year and individual identifiers to construct
our sample.
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Our main sample consists of 19 to 64 years old people from the 2013-2014 waves of the
MEPS. We exclude individuals older than 64 since the ACA was not intended to affect the
health care coverage of seniors. Because we are using an individual-level treatment variable
where the treatment is being uninsured in 2013 and MEPS panels include only two years,
we are only able to follow the same individual pre-and post-ACA between the years of 2013
and 2014. We will also use another sample that includes the 2014 and 2015 waves to identify
the effects of the ACA between 2014 and 2015. Following Courtemanche et al. (2017), we
include interactions of the post-treatment dummy with indicators of whether states set up
their own private exchanges and whether these exchanges experienced glitches. Having these
controls will eliminate some of the bias that can be caused by the omitted variables that are
hard to measure and correlated with the states' decisions to expand Medicaid, health care
utilization and coverage.
In our main specifications which include only 2013 and 2014 as sample years, we classify
the 27 states that expanded Medicaid by 2014 as Medicaid expansion states. January 2014
is the time when most of the expansions took place. For the specifications that use 2014 and
2015 year samples we classify 3 more states that expanded Medicaid in 2015 as Medicaid
expansion states.
Table 3.1 provides 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 means and standard deviations of the depen-
dent variables and Table 3.2 does the same for the controls. According to Table 3.1, counts of
utilization are very similar across the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 samples but slightly higher
in the 2014-2015 sample. However the expenditure outcomes are considerably higher in
2014-2015 sample relative to the 2013-2014 sample.
Next we will show whether these differences are driven by the ACA by relying on the com-
mon counterfactual trends assumption in the outcomes on the bases of Medicaid expansion
status and the uninsurance status in 2013.
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3.4 Econometric Analyses
For each utilization outcome, our main goal is to estimate the effects of both the fully
implemented ACA that includes Medicaid expansion and the ACA without the Medicaid
expansion. It is important to isolate the effects of the ACA components from the year-to-
year fluctuations that would have occurred even in the absence of the ACA. We adopt the
DDD strategy which exploits the variations in being treated at the individual level, as being
treated is defined as being uninsured in 2013 – just a year prior to the ACA. This DDD
strategy makes one less assumption compared to other DDD strategies that were used in the
literature which exploited local area pre-ACA uninsured rates as their treatment variable
(Courtemanche et al. 2017 and 2018) and assumed that the treatment at the individual level
was correlated with the treatment exposure at the local area level.
We first start with estimating the effect of components of the ACA on the probability
of getting coverage. Assuming that the individual is treated only when he has no insurance
coverage pre-ACA in 2013, we estimate the linear DDD model given below:
yist = β0 + β1POSTt + β2MEDICAIDs + β3Ti + β4(MEDICAIDs ∗ POSTt)+
β5(MEDICAIDs ∗ Ti) + β6(POSTt ∗ Ti) + β7(MEDICAIDs ∗ POSTt ∗ Ti)+
β8X
′
ist + εist
(3.1)
where yist is the insurance coverage indicator for individual i in state s in year t , POSTt is
an indicator whether period t is in 2014 or not, MEDICAIDs is an indicator whether state
s participated in the ACA's 2014 Medicaid expansion, Ti is the 2013 insurance status that
turns to 1 when the individual is uninsured in 2013, X
′
ist is a vector of control variables, and
εist is the error term.
In equation (3.1), β6 captures the effect of the ACA without the Medicaid expansion.
The identifying assumption for the impact of the non-Medicaid expansion components of the
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ACA is that, in the absence of the ACA, any changes in outcomes that would have occurred
to an individual in 2014 would not have varied differently by his insurance status in 2013
conditional on the controls. This is a weaker assumption than a simple DD model that only
uses a pre-post comparison which would assume there would have been no changes at all in
the outcomes without the ACA conditional on the controls.
Similarly, β7 captures the effect of the Medicaid expansion. We assume that in the
absence of the ACA, the differences in the outcomes for the insured and uninsured people
in 2013 who live in Medicaid expansion states would have evolved similarly compared to the
differentials in non-Medicaid expansion states. This is a weaker assumption than a simple
DD model which assumes that there would have been no differential changes across expansion
and non-expansion states conditional on the controls.
As our primary outcome variable, we use the counts of utilization in prescription drugs
(each time a prescription drug is purchased), inpatient hospital visits, outpatient hospital
visits, medical-provider office visits, ER visits and total counts of all these utilizations. For
our primary results, we report estimates from the negative binomial model specification due
to the nature of our data being discrete and extremely skewed to the right.
3.5 Sensitivity and Other Checks
There are a few challenges with modeling counts of health care utilization. Because
the count data is discrete and non-negative, the count data generating process may be
distorted by a linear model, leading to negative predictions (King 1988). There are a few
alternative specifications that can give better predictions like the Poisson or the negative
binomial depending on the level of dispersion. For our primary results we prefer the marginal
effects from negative binomial model because it has less restrictions on the mean-variance
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relationship compared to Poisson. In this section we will report marginal effects from Poisson
to compare and check the sensitivity of our main findings.
Later, we replicate our analyses for the main samples of 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 years
for the expenditure outcomes in dollar amounts using two-part models. The reason we use
two-part models is because an overwhelming majority of our samples do not incur any health
care utilization. Also, a two-part model does not make the assumption that the ACA and its
components affect the external and internal margins of health care expenditures in the same
direction and/or magnitude. We use a probit estimation for the first part to model how the
ACA affected the probability of any use of health care on the extensive margin and GLM
with log-link and gamma family for estimating the second part of the equation where the
dependent variable becomes any positive health care spending conditional on any spending.
The advantages of using GLM as opposed to logged-OLS and level-OLS when modeling
health care expenditures are broadly discussed in health economics literature (Manning &
Mullahy 2001, Jones 2000, Deb & Norton, 2018). The main reason to use GLM in favor of
OLS is because our data is extremely skewed to the right and GLMs have more flexibility
with dealing this extreme skewness. GLMs allow any function (the link function of the
GLM) of the outcome variable to vary linearly with the covariates, as opposed to OLS which
requires this function to be of linear nature only.
For our next set of checks we run the same regressions in our main model for the samples
pre-ACA, namely the samples of MEPS from 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. In each of these
models the treatment now is defined as the uninsurance rate in the previous year (i.e. the
treatment would be the uninsurance status in 2011 in the 2011-2012 sample and it would be
the uninsurance status in 2012 in 2012-2013 sample). Post is a dummy that turns to 1 in 2012
in the 2011-2012 sample, and it turns 1 in 2013 in the 2012-2013 sample. In essence, these
regressions provide placebo tests since a hypothetical ACA that did not actually happen in
those years should give us null results.
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Because we are using non-linear models, we report average marginal effects of the inter-
actions for our main coefficient of interest. Ai and Norton (2003) show that in non-linear
models the marginal effect of the full interaction term is not equal to the cross-difference (or
derivative in the continuous case). However, Puhani (2008) shows that the cross difference in
Ai and Norton's paper is not equal to the treatment effect and he points out that when the
treatment effect is the parameter of interest it is right to focus on the marginal effect of the
interaction term in non-linear difference-in-difference models provided that the non-linear
model has a strictly monotonic transformation function.
3.6 Results
Table 3.3 reports results from DDD regression from linear probability models for health
insurance coverage for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 samples separately. Although the ACA
was implemented in 2014 some insurance take-up continued between 2014 and 2015 as doc-
umented by literature.
The results suggest that between 2013 and 2014 private portion of the ACA increased
the probability of having insurance by 40 percentage points for those who were uninsured in
2013. The Medicaid expansion led to statistically significant additional gains on insurance
by 7 percentage points on those who were not insured in 2013. This means the fully imple-
mented ACA increased coverage on previously uninsured people by 47 percentage points at
a statistically significant level in its first year. The results from 2014-2015 sample indicate
that the impact of the fully implemented ACA on insurance was a little less but comparable
in its second year. The fully implemented ACA increased the probability of having insurance
among previously uninsured individuals by 41 percentage points at a statistically significant
level between 2014 and 2015. In its second year, Medicaid portion of the ACA increased the
probability of having insurance by 8 percentage points - just a little more than the first year's
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impact and it was statistically significant. The private portion of the ACA in its second year
significantly increased the probability of having insurance by 33 percentage points.
After showing that the ACA increased health coverage significantly we turn to analyses
on how the ACA affected health care utilization of counts. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report aver-
age marginal effects on total counts of various health care services from negative binomial
regressions for the first and second year of the ACA respectively.
According to Table 3.4, the ACA increased counts of inpatient hospital and medical-
provider office visits significantly by 0.04 and 2.5 counts of visits per person in its first
year. It also led to a significant increase in total counts of health care service use by 4
counts per person (including prescription fills, inpatient, outpatient, medical-provider office
and ER visits). The only decreasing effect of the ACA is seen on ER visit counts but it is
not statistically significant. Most of the increases in counts of visits are attributable to the
private portion of the ACA rather than the Medicaid expansion except inpatient hospital
visit counts. The private portion of the ACA increased outpatient and medical-provider office
visit counts significantly by 0.2 and 1.5 counts respectively. Interestingly, the private and
Medicaid portions of the ACA have opposite effects on inpatient hospital visits compared to
office and outpatient visits. Although insignificant, Medicaid expansion increased inpatient
hospital visits. The full effect of the ACA on inpatient hospital visits was a significant
increase, stemming from the Medicaid portion.
Table 3.5 shows the effects of the ACA and its portions on 2014-2015 sample. The
results suggest that the fully implemented ACA's impacts on health care service counts were
all positive but insignificant (barely significant on prescription fill counts and total counts)
despite its impact on health insurance coverage being comparable to the first year's. The
private portion of the ACA increased inpatient hospital visits by 0.05 per person significantly
and increased prescription fill counts by 1.7 fill per person although it was only significant
at the 10% level.
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We then replicate our main analyses running Poisson models to see whether our results
are sensitive to model selection. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the average marginal effects from
Poisson models on the counts of the same outcome variables. The Poisson model gives
very similar results to the negative binomial, pointing out that the fully implemented ACA
increased inpatient hospital visits, medical-provider office visits and total counts of utilization
in its first year significantly, at very similar magnitudes compared to main results. The only
difference is that Poisson model picks up a significant increase in total counts of health
care use that results from the private portion of the ACA. Just like the negative binomial,
Poisson results do not show any significant changes on health care use associated with the
full ACA in its second year. Only significant increase in the second year is an increase in
inpatient hospital visits associated only with the private portion of the ACA by 0.05 counts
per person. Although it is a small increase in magnitude it is consistent and significant across
both models.
Next, we conduct analyses of the ACA's first-year impact on health care spending and
use. Table 3.8 shows combined average marginal effects from the two-part models consisting
of both the external (probability of any use) and the internal margins of health care spending
(expenditures conditional on any use). We find the full ACA significantly increased medical-
provider office visit expenditures by $416 per person in its first year. The other expenditure
outcomes are not meaningfully affected by the full ACA. Table 3.9 reports average marginal
effects on the extensive margin of use. We find that the fully implemented ACA increased
probabilities of having prescriptions, inpatient hospital visits and medical-provider office
visits by 3.5, 3.4 and 10 percentage points respectively. It also resulted in an increase in
the probability of having any health care services significantly by 8 percentage points among
people who were uninsured in 2013. Results from the second part of the two-part model in
Table 3.10 model indicate that the full ACA significantly decreased spending in inpatient
hospital and ER visits by $12,632 and $1,096 per person in its first year among people who
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use these services and who were not insured prior to the ACA. Given that we found the ACA
increased the count and probability of inpatient hospital visits, this decrease in the intensive
margin of inpatient spending could be attributed to either the ACA decreasing inpatient
hospital prices/costs and/or ACA resulting in less expensive procedures in inpatient hospital
settings.
Lastly, we repeat our main regressions on counts on pre-ACA years and report these
results in Tables 3.11 and 3.12. In these placebo regressions, POSTt is defined as 2012, and
Ti is defined as being uninsured in 2011 in 2011-2012 sample. Similarly, POSTt means 2013
and Ti means being uninsured in 2012 in 2012-2013 sample. We conduct these analyses to
show that a placebo ACA does not meaningfully change utilization outcomes (or it does
not affect utilization outcomes more than it would have due to chance). We find only two
significant effects of the fully implemented placebo ACAs – an increase in prescription fills
between 2011-2012 and an increase in ER visits between 2013-2014. Although the different
portions of a hypothetical ACA do not show any significant effects between 2011 and 2012,
there are some significant effects in 2012-2013 sample for two outcomes associated with a
private portion of a placebo ACA. On the year prior to real ACA, the private portion of a
hypothetical ACA is associated with significant increases in medical-provider office visits and
total utilization counts (1.35 and 2.4 per person among those who were uninsured in 2012
respectively). The most likely explanation for these significant placebo results is the early
Medicaid expansion in several states. Alternatively, the significant placebo results could also
be just due to chance or indicate that this sample period which is just a year away from
ACA is not a true placebo period for the ACA.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we used data from Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to examine the effects
of the 2014 ACA provisions on health care utilization. Using DDD strategy that exploits
variation in time, pre-treatment uninsurance status, and state Medicaid expansion status,
we separately estimated the effects in both Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states.
The results suggest that the ACA increased health care utilization in some dimensions –
including counts of inpatient hospital visits, medical-provider office visits, as well as total
counts of health care service utilization including all of these services, outpatient and ER
visits on its first year. However, these increases in health care utilization were not observed
in ACA's second year. We also found that the ACA increased coverage and led to significant
gains in both expansion and non-expansion states consistent with what has been found by
prior studies. This significant gain in insurance was not limited to ACA's first year but it
carried to the second year.
One explanation for the lack of significant results in ACA's second year despite its sig-
nificant impact on increasing coverage could be attributed to differences among people who
got insurance immediately following the ACA relative to those who were enrolled a year
later. This can be explained by an existing pent-up demand stemming from people who
needed health insurance immediately to satisfy their unmet health care needs. People who
got coverage in ACA's second year might lack this pent-up demand relative to the people
who got the insurance in the year of ACA's immediate implementation. This finding sug-
gests that the timing and the prior health insurance coverage of the new enrollees matter in
determining changes in health care use.
We also found that the overall effect of the ACA on the whole population in its first
year was not significant in expenditures except an increase in office visits. However, ACA
significantly increased the likelihood of having any health care use across many dimensions.
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This paper leaves several questions for future research. First, we are only able to look
at the effects of the ACA in its first and second years. Future studies should keep following
ACA's effects in following years as its long-term effects may not have been realized yet.
Second, more research is needed to show how the ACA altered health care service prices.
For example, although we found the ACA increased inpatient hospital visits very moderately
we see a decrease in inpatient hospital visit expenditures among users who were uninsured
prior to the ACA. We also find the ACA resulted in decreases in expenditures of ER visits
among users of ER. However, we do not know if these spending decreases on the intensive
margin are due to price changes or people needing less expensive procedures.
Another limitation of this study is that it only focuses on individuals who lacked coverage
pre-ACA. Therefore it is not able to explain how going from a less extensive coverage to a
more extensive coverage affects health care use. More research is needed to answer this
question in the future.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Distribution of opioid expenditures - Ages 18+
67
Figure 1.2: Results from event study analyses on opioid expenditures
(a) The year MML takes effect is represented by 0. The pre-adoption year is set to zero for normalization
and excluded from the regression. The coefficients are estimates from the two-part models with probit in
the first and GLM (with a log link and gamma family) in the second part.
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Figure 2.1: Changes in Health Care Service Use Counts 2000 to 2015
Figure 2.2: Changes in Health Care Service Use Spending 2000 to 2015
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for outcome variables
Control states MML states
mean s.d mean s.d
Opioids
Participation 0.0919 0.289 0.0838 0.277
Spending 14.73 210.1 12.28 266.2
Non-opioid painkillers
Participation 0.202 0.416 0.173 0.378
Spending 40.54 229.77 30.91 339.57
Antidepressants
Participation 0.101 0.301 0.0815 0.274
Spending 48.17 263.7 38.02 236.3
Anticonvulsants
Participation 0.0591 0.236 0.0456 0.209
Spending 30.35 278.5 23.48 255.1
Sedatives
Participation 0.0822 0.275 0.0608 0.239
Spending 17.86 153.0 12.02 114.4
Number of observations 233,010 202,025
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics for control variables
Control states MML states
mean s.d mean s.d
Individual-level controls
Demographic controls
Age dummies: Ages 18-24 (ref.)
Ages 25-29 0.0922 0.289 0.0973 0.296
Ages 30-34 0.0947 0.293 0.0988 0.298
Ages 35-39 0.0952 0.293 0.101 0.301
Ages 40-44 0.0952 0.293 0.101 0.301
Ages 45-49 0.0938 0.292 0.0953 0.294
Ages 50-54 0.0886 0.284 0.0890 0.285
Ages 55-59 0.0771 0.267 0.0720 0.258
Ages 60-64 0.0617 0.241 0.0573 0.232
Ages 65-69 0.0508 0.220 0.0453 0.208
Ages 70-74 0.0408 0.198 0.0358 0.186
Ages 75-79 0.0323 0.177 0.0290 0.168
Ages 80-84 0.0229 0.149 0.0204 0.141
Ages 85-90 0.0180 0.133 0.0170 0.129
Male 0.459 0.498 0.467 0.499
Race dummies: Other (ref.)
White 0.564 0.496 0.477 0.499
Black 0.217 0.412 0.117 0.322
Hispanic 0.178 0.383 0.303 0.460
Married 0.534 0.499 0.529 0.499
Living in an MSA 0.758 0.428 0.903 0.297
Economic controls
Education dummies: Less than high school (ref.)
High school graduate 0.419 0.493 0.380 0.485
College graduate 0.264 0.441 0.304 0.460
Unemployed 0.398 0.498 0.392 0.488
Student 0.0538 0.226 0.0625 0.242
Family income as % of poverty line: Poor (ref.)
Near poor 0.370 0.483 0.350 0.477
Low income 0.164 0.371 0.156 0.363
Middle income 0.311 0.463 0.296 0.456
High income 0.289 0.453 0.340 0.474
Health insurance dummies: Uninsured (ref.)
Publicly insured 0.180 0.384 0.208 0.406
Privately insured 0.617 0.486 0.611 0.487
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State-level controls
% Unemployment rate 5.896 1.883 6.706 2.220
% Uninsured rate 15.70 4.967 14.46 4.023
$ Average personal income 33,840 6,997 39,448 8,539
$ Average household income 43,911 7,641 50,208 7,681
Decriminalization law 0.157 0.363 0.552 0.497
Prescription drug monitoring law 0.566 0.496 0.774 0.418
Table 1.4: Ages 18-39 - Average marginal effects on opioid spending
Extensive margin Intensive margin Combined
Any MML 0.00105 -37.46*** -2.473***
(0.00361) (12.64) (0.884)
Retail dispensary -0.00499 -13.23 -1.205
(0.00430) (15.23) (1.067)
Home cultivation -0.00363 -56.29** -4.042**
(0.00632) (26.09) (1.818)
Non-specific pain 0.00855 12.65 1.384
(0.00620) (25.02) (1.741)
Patient registry 0.00255 6.415 0.592
(0.00409) (24.20) (1.661)
N 186,144 186,144 12,894 12,894 186,144 186,144
Baseline means of outcomes 0.0693 0.0693 69.68 69.68 4.827 4.827
(a) Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. Controls include state and year fixed
effects, state-specific linear time trends, and all the controls listed in Table 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 1.5: Ages 40-64 - Average marginal effects on opioid spending
Extensive margin Intensive margin Combined
Any MML -0.000389 6.531 0.572
(0.00401) (44.99) (4.474)
Retail dispensary -0.014** 12.85 -0.646
(0.00446) (32.32) (3.281)
Home cultivation -0.00569 61.41 4.964
(0.0105) (73.70) (7.508)
Non-specific pain 0.00885 -45.15 -2.803
(0.0109) (66.74) (6.776)
Patient registry 0.00167 -15.18 -1.174
(0.00756) (57.06) (5.771)
N 180,723 180,723 18,220 18,220 180,723 180,723
Baseline means of outcomes 0.101 0.101 207.1 207.1 20.88 20.88
(a) Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. Controls include state and year fixed
effects, state-specific linear time trends, and all the controls listed in Table 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Table 1.6: Ages 65+ - Average marginal effects on opioid spending
Extensive margin Intensive margin Combined
Any MML -0.000999 75.82 7.917
(0.00895) (50.39) (5.591)
Retail dispensary 0.00539 2.214 1.153
(0.0116) (42.50) (4.948)
Home cultivation 0.00190 145.9 15.88
(0.0183) (90.90) (10.19)
Non-specific pain 0.00329 -75.92 -7.535
(0.0169) (99.42) (10.98)
Patient registry -0.00897 48.30 3.625
(0.0138) (94.74) (10.37)
N 68,168 68,168 7,227 7,227 68,168 68,168
Baseline means of outcomes 0.106 0.106 171.8 171.8 18.22 18.22
(a) Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. Controls include state and year fixed
effects, state-specific linear time trends, and all the controls listed in Table 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Effects of different policy combinations on opioid expenditures
18-39 40-64 65+
home+dispensary+nsp -3.863*** 1.514 9.500
(California) (1.373) (6.199) (11.71)
home+dispensary+nsp+reg -3.271** 0.341 13.12
(Colorado ) (1.332) (7.982) (8.190)
dispensary+nsp+reg 0.771 -4.623 -2.757
(New Jersey) (2.140) (7.621) (11.50)
home+nsp+reg -2.066 0.987 11.97
(Alaska) (1.820) (8.157) (8.921)
N 184,144 180,723 68,168
(a) Standard errors in parantheses are clustered at the state level. Controls include state and year fixed
effects, state-specific linear time trends, and all the controls listed in Table 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. nsp and reg mean non-pain specification and patient registry respectively.
Table 1.8: Average marginal effects on opioid pills
18-39 40-64 65+
Any MML -2.160** 1.310 0.979
(0.869) (2.753) (4.650)
Retail dispensary -1.440* -0.153 2.722
(0.847) (3.941) (6.773)
Home cultivation -3.166 3.382 -2.562
(2.088) (4.680) (13.60)
Non-specific pain 1.157 -6.588 -0.722
(2.123) (4.904) (13.94)
Patient registry 0.0881 5.282 6.178
(1.410) (4.997) (9.927)
N 184,144 186,144 180,723 180,723 68,168 68,168
Baseline means of outcomes 7.965 7.965 24.92 24.92 27.07 27.07
(a) Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. Controls include state and year fixed
effects, state-specific linear time trends, and all the controls listed in Table 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 2.1: Means of control variables
Other states Massachusetts
N=296,661 N=4,707
Individual-level controls
Age dummies: Ages 18-24 (ref.)
Ages 25-29 0.113 0.109
Ages 30-34 0.109 0.118
Ages 35-39 0.111 0.107
Ages 40-44 0.117 0.114
Ages 45-49 0.115 0.106
Ages 50-54 0.116 0.106
Ages 55-59 0.101 0.106
Ages 60-64 0.084 0.099
Male 0.492 0.486
Race dummies: White (ref.)
Black 0.285 0.258
Hispanic 0.150 0.108
Other 0.153 0.182
Married 0.554 0 .486
Education dummies: Less than high school (ref.)
High school graduate 0.247 0.206
Some college 0.069 0.083
College graduate 0.223 0.279
Unemployed 0.173 0.157
Student 0.044 0.064
Family income as % of poverty line: Poor (ref)
Near poor 0.037 0.023
Low income 0.122 0.082
Middle income 0.306 0.267
High income 0.417 0.543
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Table 2.2: Means of outcome variables
Other states Massachusetts Difference
mean mean
Counts
Prescriptions 8.98 7.92 1.603**
Inpatient visits 0.09 0.09 -0.00536
Outpatient visits 0.48 0.79 -0.312***
Office visits 4.97 6.12 -1.156***
ER visits 0.18 0.16 0.0144
Total 14.21 14.30 -0.0840
Probability of any use
Prescriptions 0.64 0.65 -0.0132
Inpatient visits 0.07 0.08 -0.00535
Outpatient visits 0.16 0.21 -0.0534***
Office visits 0.70 0.75 -0.0544***
ER visits 0.13 0.12 0.00912
Any utilization 0.78 0.81 -0.0415***
$ Spending
Prescriptions 557.65 478.90 78.75**
Inpatient visits 657.34 627.85 29.50
Outpatient visits 239.73 251.04 -11.31
Office visits 532.59 555.69 -23.10
ER visits 86.01 63.31 22.70
Total 1833.60 1725.75 107.8
(a) Differences between other states and Massachusetts is significant. *** significant at the 0.01% level, **
significant at the 0.05% level, * significant at the 0.1%. MEPS sampling weights are used.
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Table 2.3: Effects of the reform on health care utilization of counts: Average marginal effects
from negative binomial
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post -0.595** 0.0296*** 0.328***
(0.287) (0.00344) (0.0345)
Office ER Total
MA*Post 0.844*** 0.0533*** 1.183***
(0.142) (0.00448) (0.352)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 301,368 301,368 301,368
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. Controls include
all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are used.
Table 2.4: Effects of the reform on health care utilization of counts: Average marginal effects
from hurdle model
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post -0.521** 0.0346*** 0.343***
(0.260) (0.00327) (0.0235)
Office ER Total
MA*Post 0.710*** 0.0559*** 0.928***
(0.121) (0.00526) (0.311)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 301,368 301,368 301,368
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. Controls include
all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are used.
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Table 2.5: Effects of the reform on health care utilization on spending: Average marginal
effects from two-part model
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post 203.8*** 386.1*** 203.6***
(35.60) (69.11) (22.40)
Office ER Total
MA*Post 229.2*** 84.95*** 942.0***
(23.97) (9.215) (93.97)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 301,368 301,368 301,368
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. Controls include
all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are used.
Table 2.6: Effects of the reform on health care utilization on the extensive margin: Average
marginal effects from probit
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post 0.0363*** 0.0148*** 0.0882***
(0.00619) (0.00206) (0.00544)
Office ER Any utilization
MA*Post 0.0676*** 0.0451*** 0.0574***
(0.00469) (0.00264) (0.00420)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 301,368 301,368 301,368
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. Controls include
all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are used.
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Table 2.7: Effects of the reform on health care utilization on the intensive margin: Average
marginal effects from GLM
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post 277.5*** 1,855** 243.2*
(58.50) (930.4) (139.3)
Sample size 176,730 18,748 34,788
Office ER Any utilization
MA*Post 271.7*** 240.9*** 1,113***
(36.77) (73.25) (125.0)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 163,614 31,689 210,453
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. Controls include
all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are used. GLM
uses log for link function and gamma as its distributional family.
Table 2.8: Match on pretreatment levels: Average marginal effects from negative binomial
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post -0.453 0.0201 0.568***
(1.229) (0.0123) (0.120)
Sample size 71,913 84,665 81,051
Office ER Any utilization
MA*Post 0.948 0.0519** 1.720
(0.736) (0.0212) (1.680)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 69,378 104,438 92,370
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state-year, are in parentheses. Controls
include all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are
used. GLM uses log for link function and gamma as its distributional family.
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Table 2.9: Match on pretreatment trends: Average marginal effects from negative binomial
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post -0.720 0.0295* 0.149***
(0.949) (0.0177) (0.0456)
Sample size 38,624 25,887 76,939
Office ER Any utilization
MA*Post 0.964** 0.0382** 2.845***
(0.452) (0.0181) (1.090)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 57,374 47,908 34,369
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state-year, are in parentheses. Controls
include all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are
used. GLM uses log for link function and gamma as its distributional family.
Table 2.10: Match on pretreatment coverage: Average marginal effects from negative bino-
mial
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post -0.0955 0.0452*** 0.682***
(1.262) (0.0159) (0.113)
Office ER Any utilization
MA*Post 1.331** 0.0664** 2.296
(0.644) (0.0266) (1.588)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 44,856 44,856 44,856
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state-year, are in parentheses. Controls
include all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are
used. GLM uses log for link function and gamma as its distributional family.
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Table 2.11: New England states: Average marginal effects from negative binomial
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post 2.200* 0.0926*** 0.734***
(1.237) (0.0181) (0.183)
Office ER Any utilization
MA*Post 3.389*** 0.0463 6.393***
(0.587) (0.0398) (1.430)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 11,637 11,637 11,637
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state-year, are in parentheses. Controls
include all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are
used. GLM uses log for link function and gamma as its distributional family.
Table 2.12: Synthetic control group: Average marginal effects from negative binomial
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post -1.286 0.0624*** 0.832***
(1.013) (0.0123) (0.152)
Sample size 21,335 22,677 29,459
Office ER Any utilization
MA*Post 3.089*** 0.0683*** 1.604
(0.581) (0.0173) (1.440)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 21,787 29,755 21,787
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state-year, are in parentheses. Controls
include all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are
used. GLM uses log for link function and gamma as its distributional family.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for outcome variables for all the samples
2013-2014 2014-2015
mean s.d mean s.d
Insured 0.83 0.37 0.87 0.34
Counts
Prescriptions 9.90 20.51 10.12 20.58
Inpatient visits 0.08 0.36 0.07 0.36
Outpatient visits 0.42 2.36 0.46 2.48
Office visits 5.26 11.25 5.39 11.64
ER visits 0.19 0.64 0.19 0.63
Total 15.85 27.88 16.23 28.20
Probability of any use
Prescriptions 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49
Inpatient visits 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Outpatient visits 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
Office visits 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46
ER visits 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33
Any utilization 0.76 0.43 0.77 0.42
$ Spending (among users)
Prescriptions 1668 6115 1833 7554
Inpatient visits 16630 25317 19180 33911
Outpatient visits 2895 7165 3093 8371
Office visits 1529 3747 1603 4414
ER visits 1736 3478 1883 4278
Total 4914 13116 5253 15634
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for control variables
2013-2014 2014-2015
mean s.d mean s.d
Individual-level controls
Demographic controls
Age dummies: Ages 19-24 (ref.)
Ages 25-29 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.32
Ages 30-34 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31
Ages 35-39 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.30
Ages 40-44 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
Ages 45-49 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
Ages 50-54 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32
Ages 55-59 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32
Ages 60-64 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
Male 0.49 0.498 0.49 0.50
Race dummies: White (ref.)
Black 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33
Hispanic 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38
Other 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
Married 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
Dummies for number of children in home: None (ref.)
One child 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.40
Two children 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37
Three children 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25
Four children 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Five children or more 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Economic controls
Education dummies: Less than high school (ref.)
High school graduate 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.35
Some college 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.36
College graduate 0.29 0.46 0.22 0.41
Unemployed 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.38
Student 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.21
Family income as % of poverty line: Poor (ref)
Near poor 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
Low income 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.33
Middle income 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45
High income 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.49
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Table 3.3: Effects of ACA on probability of having insurance coverage: LPM results
2013-2014 2014-2015
Coefficient Estimates of Interest
Post*Treatment 0.398*** 0.332***
(0.0189) (0.0297)
Medicaid expansion*Post* 0.0717** 0.0789**
Treatment (0.0298) (0.0378)
Implied Effect of ACA
Full ACA 0.469*** 0.411***
(0.0231) (0.0242)
Sample size 39,914 39,032
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. Controls include
all the controls listed in Table 3.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are used.
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Table A2.1: Effects of the reform on health care utilization of counts: Average marginal
effects from poisson
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*Post 0.218 0.0305*** 0.312***
(0.249) (0.00370) (0.0246)
Office ER Total
MA*Post 0.429*** 0.0566*** 0.624*
(0.142) (0.00425) (0.324)
State and year f.e Y Y Y
State specific linear time trends Y Y Y
Sample size 301,368 301,368 301,368
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. Controls include
all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. MEPS sampling weights are used.
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Table A2.2: Regressions with aggregated data
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*during 2.068*** 0.0338*** 0.539***
(0.786) (0.00851) (0.0790)
MA*after 4.450*** 0.0102 0.209*
(0.936) (0.0132) (0.116)
Office ER Total
MA*during 1.118** 0.0139 2.068***
(0.552) (0.0179) (0.786)
MA*after 1.400*** 0.0513*** 4.450***
(0.475) (0.0173) (0.936)
Dummies for during and after periods Y Y Y
Sample size 813 813 813
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state-year, are in parentheses. Controls
include all the controls listed in Table 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The control group consists of
all 50 states. MEPS sampling weights are used when aggregating.
Table A2.3: Regressions with aggregated data
Prescriptions Inpatient Outpatient
MA*during -0.212 0.0337*** 0.801***
(0.238) (0.00205) (0.00293)
MA*after 2.144*** 0.0125 0.512***
(0.512) (0.0103) (0.0930)
Office ER Total
MA*during 2.042*** 9.54e-05 1.863**
(0.551) (0.00946) (0.778)
MA*after 2.775*** 0.0375*** 4.969***
(0.398) (0.0135) (0.872)
Year f.e Y Y Y
Sample size 32 32 32
(a) Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust are in parentheses. Controls include all the controls listed
in Table 2.1 and a dummy for MA. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The control group consists of one
cross-sectional unit collapsing all individuals from the other 50 states. MEPS sampling weights are used
when aggregating.
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